Why may not I say visible extension is a continuity of visible points, tangible extension is a continuity of tangible points? ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M353) Mem. That I take notice that I do not fall in wth sceptics, Fardella(207), &c., in that I make bodies to exist certainly, wch they doubt of. (M354) I am more certain of ye existence & reality of bodies than Mr. Locke; since he pretends onely to wt he calls sensitive knowledge(208), whereas I think I have demonstrative knowledge of their existence—by them meaning combinations of powers in an unknown substratum(209). ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M355) Our ideas we call figure & extension, not images of the figure and extension of matter; these (if such there be) being infinitely divisible, those not so. ’Tis impossible a material cube should exist, because the edges of a cube will appear broad to an acute sense. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Men die, or are in [a] state of annihilation, oft in a day. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M356) Powers. Qu. whether more or one onely? ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Lengths abstract from breadths are the work of the mind. Such do intersect in a point at all angles. After the same way colour is abstract from extension. Every position alters the line. Qu. whether ideas of extension are made up of other ideas, v.g. idea of a foot made up of general ideas of an inch? The idea of an inch length not one determin’d idea. Hence enquire the reason why we are out in judging of extension by the sight; for which purpose ’tis meet also to consider the frequent & sudden changes of extension by position. No stated ideas of length without a minimum. (M357) Material substance banter’d by Locke, b. 2. c. 13. s. 19. (M358) In my doctrine all absurdities from infinite space &c. cease(210). Qu. whether if (speaking grossly) the things we see were all of them at all times too small to be felt, we should have confounded tangible & visible extension and figure? ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (M359) Qu. whether if succession of ideas in the Eternal Mind, a day does not seem to God a 1000 years, rather than a 1000 years a day? ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ But one only colour & its degrees. Enquiry about a grand mistake in writers of dioptricks in assigning the cause of microscopes magnifying objects. Qu. whether a born-blind [man] made to see would at 1st give the name of distance to any idea intromitted by sight; since he would take distance yt that he had perceived by _touch_ to be something existing without his mind, but he would certainly think that nothing _seen_ was without his mind(211)?