The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21Berkeley, George
Philosophy
The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21
Berkeley, George
Philosophy -- Early works to 1800
(M360) Space without any bodies existing _in rerum natura_ would not be
extended, as not having parts—in that parts are assigned to it wth respect
to body; from whence also the notion of distance is taken. Now without
either parts or distance or mind, how can there be Space, or anything
beside one uniform Nothing?
Two demonstrations that blind made to see would not take all things he saw
to be without his mind, or not in a point—the one from microscopic eyes,
the other from not perceiving distance, i.e. radius of the visual sphere.
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
(M361) The trees are in the park, i.e. whether I will or no, whether I
imagine anything about them or no. Let me but go thither and open my eyes
by day, & I shall not avoid seeing them.
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
By extension blind [man] would mean either the perception caused in his
touch by something he calls extended, or else the power of raising that
perception; wch power is without, in the thing termed extended. Now he
could not know either of these to be in things visible till he had try’d.
Geometry seems to have for its object tangible extension, figures, &
motion—and not visible(212).
A man will say a body will seem as big as before, tho’ the visible idea it
yields be less than wt it was; therefore the bigness or tangible extension
of the body is different from the visible extension.
Extension or space no simple idea—length, breadth, & solidity being three
several ideas.
Depth or solidity _now_ perceived by sight(213).
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
Strange impotence of men. Man without God wretcheder than a stone or tree;
he having onely the power to be miserable by his unperformed wills, these
having no power at all(214).
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
Length perceivable by hearing—length & breadth by sight—length, breadth, &
depth by touch.
(M362) Wt affects us must be a thinking thing, for wt thinks not cannot
subsist.
Number not in bodies, it being the creature of the mind, depending
entirely on its consideration, & being more or less as the mind
pleases(215).
Mem. Quære whether extension be equally a sensation with colour? The mob
use not the word extension. ’Tis an abstract term of the Schools.
(M363) Round figure a perception or sensation in the mind, but in the body
is a power. L[ocke], b. 2. c. 8. s. 8.
Mem. Mark well the later part of the last cited section.
Solids, or any other tangible things, are no otherwise seen than colours
felt by the German Count.
(M364) “Of” and “thing” causes of mistake.
The visible point of he who has microscopical eyes will not be greater or
less than mine.
Qu. Whether the propositions & even axioms of geometry do not divers of
them suppose the existence of lines &c. without the mind?
(M365) Whether motion be the measure of duration? Locke, b. 2. c. 14. s.
19.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account