The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21Berkeley, George
Philosophy
The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21
Berkeley, George
Philosophy -- Early works to 1800
82. Of these visible points we see at all times an equal number. It is
every whit as great when our view is contracted and bounded by near
objects as when it is extended to larger and remoter ones. For, it being
impossible that one _minimum visibile_ should obscure or keep out of sight
more than one other, it is a plain consequence that, when my view is on
all sides bounded by the walls of my study, I see just as many visible
points as I could in case that, by the removal of the study-walls and all
other obstructions, I had a full prospect of the circumjacent fields,
mountains, sea, and open firmament. For, so long as I am shut up within
the walls, by their interposition every point of the external objects is
covered from my view. But, each point that is seen being able to cover or
exclude from sight one only other corresponding point, it follows that,
whilst my sight is confined to those narrow walls, I see as many points,
or _minima visibilia_, as I should were those walls away, by looking on
all the external objects whose prospect is intercepted by them. Whenever,
therefore, we are said to have a greater prospect at one time than
another, this must be understood with relation, not to the proper and
immediate, but the secondary and mediate objects of vision—which, as hath
been shewn, do properly belong to the touch.
83. The visive faculty, considered with reference to its immediate
objects, may be found to labour of two defects. _First_, in respect of the
extent or number of visible points that are at once perceivable by it,
which is narrow and limited to a certain degree. It can take in at one
view but a certain determinate number of _minima visibilia_, beyond which
it cannot extend its prospect. _Secondly_, our sight is defective in that
its view is not only narrow, but also for the most part confused. Of those
things that we take in at one prospect, we can see but a few at once
clearly and unconfusedly; and the more we fix our sight on any one object,
by so much the darker and more indistinct shall the rest appear.
84. Corresponding to these two defects of sight, we may imagine as many
perfections, to wit, 1st. That of comprehending in one view a greater
number of visible points; 2dly, of being able to view them all equally and
at once, with the utmost clearness and distinction. That those perfections
are not actually in some intelligences of a different order and capacity
from ours, it is impossible for us to know(376).
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