The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21Berkeley, George
Philosophy
The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21
Berkeley, George
Philosophy -- Early works to 1800
85. In neither of those two ways do microscopes contribute to the
improvement of sight. For, when we look through a microscope, we neither
see more visible points, nor are the collateral points more distinct, than
when we look with the naked eye at objects placed at a due distance. A
microscope brings us, as it were, into a new world. It presents us with a
new scene of visible objects, quite different from what we behold with the
naked eye. But herein consists the most remarkable difference, to wit,
that whereas the objects perceived by the eye alone have a certain
connexion with tangible objects, whereby we are taught to foresee what
will ensue upon the approach or application of distant objects to the
parts of our own body—which much conduceth to its preservation(377)—there
is not the like connexion between things tangible and those visible
objects that are perceived by help of a fine microscope.
86. Hence, it is evident that, were our eyes turned into the nature of
microscopes, we should not be much benefitted by the change. We should be
deprived of the forementioned advantage we at present receive by the
visive faculty, and have left us only the empty amusement of seeing,
without any other benefit arising from it. But, in that case, it will
perhaps be said, our sight would be endued with a far greater sharpness
and penetration than it now hath. But I would fain know wherein consists
that sharpness which is esteemed so great an excellency of sight. It is
certain, from what we have already shewn(378), that the _minimum visibile_
is never greater or lesser, but in all cases constantly the same. And in
the case of microscopical eyes, I see only this difference, to wit, that
upon the ceasing of a certain observable connexion betwixt the divers
perceptions of sight and touch, which before enabled us to regulate our
actions by the eye, it would now be rendered utterly unserviceable to that
purpose.
87. Upon the whole, it seems that if we consider the use and end of sight,
together with the present state and circumstances of our being, we shall
not find any great cause to complain of any defect or imperfection in it,
or easily conceive how it could be mended. With such admirable wisdom is
that faculty contrived, both for the pleasure and convenience of life.
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