The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21Berkeley, George
Philosophy
The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21
Berkeley, George
Philosophy -- Early works to 1800
33. The ideas imprinted on the Senses by the Author of nature are called
_real things_: and those excited in the imagination, being less regular,
vivid, and constant, are more properly termed _ideas_ or _images of_
things, which they copy and represent. But then our _sensations_, be they
never so vivid and distinct, are nevertheless ideas(586): that is, they
exist in the mind, or are perceived by it, as truly as the ideas of its
own framing. The ideas of Sense are allowed to have more reality(587) in
them, that is, to be more strong, orderly, and coherent than the creatures
of the mind; but this is no argument that they exist without the mind.
They are also less dependent on the spirit or thinking substance which
perceives them, in that they are excited by the will of another and more
powerful Spirit; yet still they are _ideas_: and certainly no idea,
whether faint or strong, can exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving
it(588).
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34. Before we proceed any farther it is necessary we spend some time in
answering Objections(589) which may probably be made against the
Principles we have hitherto laid down. In doing of which, if I seem too
prolix to those of quick apprehensions, I desire I may be excused, since
all men do not equally apprehend things of this nature; and I am willing
to be understood by every one.
_First_, then, it will be objected that by the foregoing principles all
that is real and substantial in nature is banished out of the world, and
instead thereof a chimerical scheme of _ideas_ takes place. All things
that exist exist only in the mind; that is, they are purely notional. What
therefore becomes of the sun, moon, and stars? What must we think of
houses, rivers, mountains, trees, stones; nay, even of our own bodies? Are
all these but so many chimeras and illusions on the fancy?—To all which,
and whatever else of the same sort may be objected, I answer, that by the
Principles premised we are not deprived of any one thing in nature.
Whatever we see, feel, hear, or any wise conceive or understand, remains
as secure as ever, and is as real as ever. There is a _rerum natura_, and
the distinction between realities and chimeras retains its full force.
This is evident from sect. 29, 30, and 33, where we have shewn what is
meant by _real things_, in opposition to _chimeras_ or _ideas of our own
framing_; but then they both equally exist in the mind, and in that
sense(590) are alike _ideas_.
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