The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21Berkeley, George
Philosophy
The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4: Philosophical Works, 1705-21
Berkeley, George
Philosophy -- Early works to 1800
77. But, say you, though it be granted that there is no thoughtless
support of extension, and the other qualities or accidents which we
perceive, yet there may perhaps be some inert, unperceiving substance or
_substratum_ of some other qualities, as incomprehensible to us as colours
are to a man born blind, because we have not a sense adapted to them. But,
if we had a new sense, we should possibly no more doubt of _their_
existence than a blind man made to see does of the existence of light and
colours.—I answer, first, if what you mean by the word _Matter_ be only
the unknown support of unknown qualities, it is no matter whether there is
such a thing or no, since it no way concerns us. And I do not see the
advantage there is in disputing about what we know not _what_, and we know
not _why_.
78. But, secondly, if we had a new sense, it could only furnish us with
new ideas or sensations; and then we should have the same reason against
_their_ existing in an unperceiving substance that has been already
offered with relation to figure, motion, colour, and the like.
_Qualities_, as hath been shewn, are nothing else but _sensations_ or
_ideas_, which exist only in a mind perceiving them; and this is true not
only of the ideas we are acquainted with at present, but likewise of all
possible ideas whatsoever(658).
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79. But you will insist, What if I have no reason to believe the existence
of Matter? what if I cannot assign any use to it, or explain anything by
it, or even conceive what is meant by that word? yet still it is no
contradiction to say that Matter _exists_, and that this Matter is _in
general_ a _substance_, or _occasion of ideas_; though indeed to go about
to unfold the meaning, or adhere to any particular explication of those
words may be attended with great difficulties.—I answer, when words are
used without a meaning, you may put them together as you please, without
danger of running into a contradiction. You may say, for example, that
_twice two_ is equal to _seven_; so long as you declare you do not take
the words of that proposition in their usual acceptation, but for marks of
you know not what. And, by the same reason, you may say there is an inert
thoughtless substance without accidents, which is the occasion of our
ideas. And we shall understand just as much by one proposition as the
other.
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