(We must assume that what has just been said about his substance applies equally to his powers.(689) For it cannot be that a god’s substance is one thing, and his power another, and his activity, by Zeus, a third thing besides these. For all that he wills he is, and can do, and puts into action. For he does not will what is not, nor does he lack power to do what he wills, nor does he desire to put into action what he cannot. In the case of a human being, however, this is otherwise. For his is a two‐ fold contending nature of soul and body compounded into one, the former divine, the latter dark and clouded. Naturally, therefore, there is a battle and a feud between them. And Aristotle also says that this is why neither the pleasures nor the pains in us harmonise with one another. For he says that what is pleasant to one of the natures within us is painful to the nature which is its opposite. But among the gods there is nothing of this sort. For from their very nature what is good belongs to them, and perpetually, not intermittently. In the first place, then, all that I said when I tried to show forth his substance, I must be considered to have said about his powers and activities also. And since in such cases the argument is naturally convertible, all that I observe next in order concerning his powers and activities must be considered to apply not to his activities only, but to his substance also. For verily there are gods related to Helios and of like substance who sum up the stainless nature of this god, and though in the visible world they are plural, in him they are one. And now listen first to what they assert who look at the heavens, not like horses and cattle, or some other unreasoning and ignorant animal,(690) but from it draw their conclusions about the unseen world. But even before this, if you please, consider his supra‐mundane powers and activities, and out of a countless number, observe but a few.) Πρώτη δὴ τῶν δυνάμεών ἐστιν αὐτοῦ, δι᾽ ἧς ὅλην δι᾽ ὅλης τὴν νοερὰν οὐσίαν, τὰς ἀκρότητας αὐτῆς εἰς ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸ συνάγων, ἀποφαίνει μίαν. ὅσπερ γὰρ περὶ τὸν αἰσθητόν ἐστι κόσμον ἐναργῶς κατανοῆσαι, πυρὸς καὶ γῆς εἰλημμένον ἀέρα καὶ ὕδωρ ἐν μέσῳ, τῶν ἄκρων σύνδεσμον, τοῦτο οὐκ ἄν τις εἰκότως [D] ἐπὶ τῆς πρὸ τῶν σωμάτων αἰτίας κεχωρισμένης, ἣ τῆς γενέσεως ἔχουσα τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἔστι γένεσις, οὕτω διατετάχθαι νομίσειεν, ὥστε καὶ ἐν ἐκείνοις τὰς ἄκρας αἰτίας κεχωρισμένας πάντη τῶν σωμάτων ὑπό τινων μεσοτήτων εἰς ταὐτὸ παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως Ἡλίου συναγομένας ἑνοῦσθαι περὶ αὐτόν; συντρέχει δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ ἡ τοῦ Διὸς δημιουργικὴ δύναμις, δι᾽ ἣν ἔφαμεν καὶ πρότερον ἱδρῦσθαί τε αὐτοῖς ἐν Κύπρῳ καὶ ἀποδεδεῖχθαι κοινῇ τὰ τεμένη· [144] καὶ τὸν Ἀπόλλω δὲ αὐτὸν ἐμαρτυρόμεθα τῶν λόγων, ὃν εἰκὸς δήπουθεν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ φύσεως ἄμεινον εἰδέναι· σύνεστι γὰρ καὶ οὗτος Ἡλίῳ καὶ ἐπικοινωνεῖ διὰ τὴν(691) ἁπλότητα τῶν νοήσεων καὶ τὸ μόνιμον τῆς οὐσίας καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὂν τῆς ἐνεργείας.(692)