It is granted, that there is a fitness and unfitness of actions founded in the nature of things, and resulting from the relations that persons and things bear to one another. It is also granted, that the reasonableness of most of the duties of children to their parents, of parents to their children, and of men to men, is very apparent, from the relations they bear to one another; and that several of the duties which we owe to God, plainly appear to us, as soon as we acknowledge the relation that is between God and us. But then, this _whole argument_ proves directly the contrary to that which this author intended to prove by it. I here therefore join with this author; I readily grant, that the nature, reason and relations of things and persons, and the fitness of actions resulting from thence, is the _sole rule_ of God’s actions. And I appeal to this one common principle, as a sufficient proof that a man cannot thus abide by the _sole light_ of his own reason, without contradicting the nature and reason of things, and denying this to be the _sole rule_ of God’s actions. * For if the _fitness_ of actions is founded in the _nature_ of things and persons, and this fitness be the _sole rule_ of God’s actions, it is certain that the rule by which he acts, must in many instances be _entirely_ inconceivable by us, so as not to be known _at all_, and in no instances _fully_ known, or _perfectly_ comprehended. * For if God is to act according to a _fitness founded_ in the _nature_ of things, and nothing can be fit for him to do, but what has its fitness founded in his own _incomprehensible_ nature, must he not necessarily act by a rule _above_ all human comprehension? If he must govern his actions by his own nature, he must act by a _rule_ that is just as _incomprehensible_ to us as his own nature. * And we can be no farther _competent judges_ of the _fitness_ of the conduct of God, than we are competent judges of the divine nature; and can no more tell what is, or is not _infinitely wise_ in God, than we can raise ourselves to a _state_ of infinite wisdom. So that if the _fitness_ of actions is founded in the _particular nature_ of things and persons, and the fitness of God’s actions must arise from that which is _particular_ to his nature, then we have from this argument, the _utmost certainty_ that the _rule_ or _reasons_ of God’s actions must in many cases be entirely inconceivable by us, and in no cases perfectly apprehended; and for this very reason, because he is not an _arbitrary being_, that acts by _mere will_, but is governed in every thing he does, by the reason and nature of things. How mistaken therefore is this author, when he argues after this manner. _If God requires things of us, whose fitness our reason can’t prove from the nature of things, must he not be an arbitrary being?_ For how can that prove God to be an arbitrary agent, which is the necessary consequence of his not being arbitrary?