For all these objections proceed upon this supposition, that _atonement_, or _satisfaction_, when attributed to Jesus Christ, signify neither more nor less, than when they are used as terms in _human laws_ or in _civil_ life; take away this supposition, and all objections are entirely removed with it. To return: I have granted this writer his great principle, _That the relations of things and persons, and the fitness resulting from thence, is the sole rule of God’s actions_: and I have granted it upon this supposition, that it thence follows, that God must act according to his _own nature_; and therefore nothing could be fit for God to do, but what had the reason of its fitness in his own nature: and if so, then the _rule_ of his actions could not fall within our comprehension. And consequently, _reason alone_, could not be a competent judge of God’s proceedings; or say, what God might, or might not, require of us: and therefore I have, plainly turned his main argument against himself, and made it fully confute that doctrine, which he intended to found upon it. But though I have thus far, granted the _nature_ and _relations_ of things and beings, to be the rule of God’s actions, because that plainly supposes, that his _own nature_ must be the rule of his actions; yet since our _author_, and other modern opposers of revealed doctrines of religion, hold it in another sense, and mean by it, I know not what _eternal, immutable_ reasons and relations of things, _independent_ of any being, and which are a _common rule and law of God and man_, I entirely declare against it, as an erroneous and groundless opinion. Thus, when this writer says, _If the relations between things, and the fitness resulting from thence, be not the sole rule of God’s actions, must he not be an arbitrary being?_ As he here means some _eternal, immutable relations, independent_ of God; so, to suppose, that God cannot be a _wise_ and _good_ being, unless such eternal, independent relations, be the _sole rule_ of his actions, is as erroneous, as to affirm, that God cannot be _omniscient_, unless _mathematical demonstrations_ be his _sole manner_ of knowing all things. And it is just as reasonable to fix God’s knowledge _solely_ in mathematical demonstrations, that we may thence be assured of his _infallible knowledge_, as to make I know not what independent relations of things, the _sole rule_ of his actions, that we may thence be assured, he is not _arbitrary_, but a wise and good being. And we have as strong reasons to believe God to be, in the highest degree, _wise_ and _good_, without knowing on what, his wisdom and goodness is _founded_; as we have to believe him to be _omniscient_, and _eternal_, without knowing on _what_ his _omniscience_ is founded; or to _what_, his eternity is owing. And we have the same reason to hold it a vain enquiry, to ask what obliges God to be _wise_ and _good_, as to ask what obliges him to be _omniscient_, or _eternal_.