And as it would be absurd to ascribe the _existence_ of God to _any cause_, or found it upon any _independent relations_ of things, so it is the same absurdity, to ascribe the infinite wisdom and goodness of God to _any cause_, or found them upon any independent relations of things. Nor do we any more _lose_ the notion, or _lessen_ the certainty of the divine wisdom and goodness, because we cannot say on _what_ they are founded, than we _lose_ the notion of God, or render his existence _uncertain_, because it cannot be founded on any thing. And as in our account of the existence of things, we are obliged to have recourse to a being, whose existence must not be ascribed to _any cause_ because every thing cannot have a cause, no more than every thing can be created, so in our account of _wisdom_ and _goodness_, there is the same necessity of having recourse to an infinite wisdom and goodness, that never _began_ to be, and that is as different as to its _manner_ of existence, from all other wisdom and goodness, that have a beginning, as the _existence_ of God is _different_ from the existence of the creatures. * But if it be necessary to hold, that there is an infinite wisdom and goodness that _never began_ to be, then it is as necessary to affirm, that such wisdom and goodness can no more be _founded_ upon the _relations_ of things, than the _unbeginning existence_ of God can be _founded_ upon the existence of things. And to seek for any _reasons_ of a wisdom and goodness that was always in the _same infinite_ state, is like seeking the cause of that which can have no cause, or asking _what_ it is that _contains_ infinity. * When therefore this writer saith, _Infinite wisdom can have no commands, but what are founded on the unalterable reason of things_;¹ he might as justly have said, an _infinite Creator_ can have no power of creating, but what is founded on the _unalterable nature_ of creatures. ¹ Page 247. * For the _reason_ of things, is just as unalterable, as the _nature_ of creatures. And if the reasons and relations of things are nothing else but their _manner_ of existence, or the _state_ of their nature, certainly the relations of things must have the same _beginning_, and the same _alterable_ or unalterable nature, as the things from whence they flow. Unless it can be said, that a thing may exist in _such a manner_, though it does not exist at all. When therefore he says again, _That the will of God is always determined by the nature and reason of things_;¹ It is the same as if he had said, the _omnipotence_ of God is always determined by the _nature_ of _causes_ and _effects_. For as all causes and effects are what they are, and _owe_ their _nature_ to the omnipotence of God, so the relations of things are what they are, and owe their nature to the wisdom and will of God. ¹ Page 65.