“For if the relations between things and persons, and the things resulting from thence, be the sole rule of God’s actions,”¹ as he expressly affirms; then the _sole rule_ or reason of God’s revealing any thing to any men, at any time, must have its _fitness resulting_ from the divine fore-knowledge of the effects of _such_ a revelation, at _such_ a time, and to _such_ persons. If God does not act thus, he does not act according to the relation betwixt a _fore-knowing Creator_, and his free creatures. But if he does act according to a _fitness resulting_ from this _relation_, and makes, or does not make revelations, according to his own fore-knowledge of the fitness of times and persons for them; then to ask how a God, always equally good, can make a revelation at any time, and not make the _same_ at _all_ times, is as absurd as to ask, how a God, always equally good, can reveal that at one time, because it is a _proper_ time for it, and not reveal it at every other time, tho’ improper for it. ¹ Page 28. * God’s goodness, directed by his own fore-knowledge of the _fitness_ of times, and of the _state_ and _actions_ of free agents, deferred a certain revelation to the time of _Tiberius_, because he _fore-saw_ it would then be an act of the _greatest_ goodness, and have its _best effects_ upon the world: to ask therefore, _what reason can be assigned_, why so good a revelation was not _sooner_, or even from the _beginning_ made to the world, is asking, why God should act, according to his _own fore-knowledge_ of the _state_ and _actions_ of _free agents_, and order all things, according to a fitness resulting from such a fore-knowledge? These questions suppose, that if God shewed his _goodness_ to mankind by a revelation at such time, he must be _wanting_ in goodness before that time, because he did not make it _sooner_; whereas if his deferring it till _such_ a time, was owing to his _fore-knowledge_ of the actions and state of free agents, and because it would then have its _best effects_, then God is proved to be equally good before he made it, for this very reason, because he did not make it before its _proper_ time: and he had been wanting in goodness, if he had not _deferred_ it till that time. Now this appealing to God’s fore-knowledge of the state and actions of _free agents_, as the cause of all that is particular in the _time_ and _manner_ of any revelation, and deducing its fitness from thence, cannot be said to be _begging the question_, but is resolving it directly according to the _rule_, which this writer lays down for God to act by: that “the relations between things and persons, _and_ the fitness resulting from thence, must be the sole rule of God’s actions.”