But if this is the _sole rule_, then God in giving any revelation, must act as the _relation_ betwixt a _fore-knowing_ Creator and his _free_ creatures requires; and his actions must have their _fitness resulting_ from his fore-knowledge of the _state_ and _actions_ of free agents. And if this is God’s sole rule, then to ask why _this_ or _that_ revelation _only_ at _such_ a time, is to ask why God _only_ does that which is _fit_ for him to do? And to ask, why not the same revelation at any other time, is asking why God does not do that, which it is _not fit_ for him to do? This writer asks, “How it is consistent with the notion of God’s being universally benevolent, not to have revealed it to all his children, who had equal need of it?” But if they had _equal need_ of it, yet if they were not _equally fit_ for it, but prepared only to have their _guilt_ increased by it, and so be exposed to a greater damnation; then God’s goodness to them is manifest, by withholding such information from them, and reserving it for those that would be made happier by it. _Judas_, _Pontius Pilate_, and the _Jews_ that called for our Saviour’s crucifixion, had _equal need_ of a Saviour with those that believed in him. _Chorazin_ and _Bethsaida_ wanted the light of the gospel as much as those that received it. And if the rest of the world had been, at that time, as much indisposed for the light of the gospel, as they were, God’s goodness had been, greater to that age, if he had reserved the light of the gospel till a better age had succeeded. So that this argument, founded on the _equal need_ of all, or former ages, has no force, unless it could be shewn, that the same revelation made to any of these former ages, would have produced all those good effects, which God foresaw would follow, from its being reserved for such a _particular time_ and _state_ of things and persons. He asks again, “Was it not as easy for God to have communicated it to all nations, as to any one nation or person? Or in all languages, as in any one?” This argument is built upon this supposition, that God does things because they are _easy_, or forbears things because they are _difficult_ to be performed. For it can be no argument, that God ought to have revealed such things to _all_ nations or persons, because it was as _easy_ to him, as to do it to _any one_ nation or person; unless it be supposed, that the _easiness_ of a thing is a reason why God does it, and the difficulty of a thing a reason why he does not do it. But if this supposition be very absurd, then the argument founded upon it must be liable to the same charge.