Apologetics -- History -- Early church, ca. 30-600; Celsus (Platonic philosopher), active 180; Theology -- History -- Early Church, ca. 30-600
4. And now I do not understand by what proofs they can maintain their
position, who assert that worlds sometimes come into existence which are
not dissimilar to each other, but in all respects equal. For if there is
said to be a world similar in all respects [to the present], then it
will come to pass that Adam and Eve will do the same things which they
did before: there will be a second time the same deluge, and the same
Moses will again lead a nation numbering nearly six hundred thousand out
of Egypt; Judas will also a second time betray the Lord; Paul will a
second time keep the garments of those who stoned Stephen; and
everything which has been done in this life will be said to be
repeated,—a state of things which I think cannot be established by any
reasoning, if souls are actuated by freedom of will, and maintain either
their advance or retrogression according to the power of their will. For
souls are not driven on in a cycle which returns after many ages to the
same round, so as either to do or desire this or that; but at whatever
point the freedom of their own will aims, thither do they direct the
course of their actions. For what these persons say is much the same as
if one were to assert that if a medimnus of grain were to be poured out
on the ground, the fall of the grain would be on the second occasion
identically the same as on the first, so that every individual grain
would lie for the second time close beside that grain where it had been
thrown before, and so the medimnus would be scattered in the same order,
and with the same marks as formerly; which certainly is an impossible
result with the countless grains of a medimnus, even if they were to be
poured out without ceasing for many ages. So therefore it seems to me
impossible for a world to be restored for the second time, with the same
order and with the same amount of births, and deaths, and actions; but
that a diversity of worlds may exist with changes of no unimportant
kind, so that the state of another world may be for some unmistakeable
reasons better [than this], and for others worse, and for others again
intermediate. But what may be the number or measure of this I confess
myself ignorant, although, if any one can tell it, I would gladly learn.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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