The Yankee mining squadron : $b or, laying the North Sea mine barrage — John Shaqi
The Yankee mining squadron : $b or, laying the North Sea mine barrageBelknap, Reginald Rowan
History
The Yankee mining squadron : $b or, laying the North Sea mine barrage
Belknap, Reginald Rowan
Submarine mines; United States. Navy; World War, 1914-1918 -- Naval operations -- Submarine
There would be three “systems,” each consisting of one or more rows of
mines just below the surface, dangerous to any craft, and other rows
at intermediate and extreme depths, so that, whether running on the
surface or at ordinary submergence or as deep as 240 feet, a submarine
had the odds against her. In the absence of patrol vessels to drive them
down, submarines would naturally run on the surface, and so the rows of
upper level mines were made more numerous than those at deeper levels.
The stroke of a mine is sudden and powerful, and while a vessel on the
surface may survive it, to a submerged submarine it is usually fatal.
All classes of vessels shy at a minefield, and that the Germans shared
this aversion was shown by captured papers, which made it clear that the
submarines dreaded nothing so much as mines.
The scheme was unprecedented, and that its great magnitude would involve
a mass of detail requiring very careful adjustment was evident on the
most cursory examination. Some who heard of it regarded it as impossible,
and foolish to attempt. As to the new mines, the very basis of the whole
project—since a complete unit would not exist for several months, the
statement of Rear Admiral Ralph Earle, Chief of the Naval Bureau of
Ordnance, that the mines would be forthcoming in season, had to be based
upon tests of the mine only by parts, with the assumption that all would
function properly when assembled. Action upon that assurance would at
once involve upward of forty million dollars, which made his stand a
bold one, inviting unmeasured odium, should the mine after all fail. To
await the mine’s final proving, however, would have been fatal to any
possibility of beginning the barrage before 1919.
The task of laying the barrier would be hazardous in itself, with
constant danger of interruption by the enemy. A single minefield in the
open sea, or widely separated ones, presented no extreme difficulties,
but to lay a series of them so close together as to leave no considerable
gaps between, made a problem for which no really practical solution was
yet visible.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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