The Yankee mining squadron : $b or, laying the North Sea mine barrage — John Shaqi
The Yankee mining squadron : $b or, laying the North Sea mine barrageBelknap, Reginald Rowan
History
The Yankee mining squadron : $b or, laying the North Sea mine barrage
Belknap, Reginald Rowan
Submarine mines; United States. Navy; World War, 1914-1918 -- Naval operations -- Submarine
While the ships were unloading the mines they had brought, for overhaul
on shore, and were coaling and otherwise preparing for minelaying, the
larger preliminaries were taken up at a conference of Rear Admiral
Strauss and myself with Admiral Sir David Beatty, Commander-in-Chief of
H.B.M. Grand Fleet. Vice Admiral Brock, his Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral
Clinton-Baker, the British Rear Admiral of Mines, Captain Lockhart-Leith,
the head of his Staff, and Captain R. A. Pound, of the Admiralty,
attended this conference, which was held on board the flagship _Queen
Elizabeth_, at Rosyth, Thursday, 30 May, 1918.
First came the subject of tactics, and I explained my plan, to lay
the mines with the squadron steaming in line abreast, ships 500 yards
apart, making a trace on the chart like a music score. Three vessels
(later five) would be laying mines simultaneously. When a ship had
emptied herself of mines, her neighbor, ready and waiting while steaming
alongside, would begin. At the end of the minefield, some temporary
small buoys would be planted, by which to pick the field up later, to
continue it. This plan was accepted without comment.
The area to be mined having been publicly notified two months before,
the enemy might have placed some mines there, on the random chance of
damaging our force. The only arrangement practicable to meet such a
contingency was for some of the destroyer escort to explore for mines
ahead of the minelaying formation as it proceeded. Only those ships would
be fully protected that might be following directly in the wake of the
searching destroyers, the main purpose being to discover the existence of
an enemy minefield in time for the squadron to maneuver aside.
A clear understanding was reached at the conference of the relation
of the mine squadron and its escort to the supporting force. The mine
squadron being lightly armed and of moderate speed, it would have been
at great disadvantage against even a numerically weaker force of light
cruisers, with their superior batteries and speed. Hence the need of
the support, which would consist of a battleship or battle cruiser
squadron, or both, and of light cruisers, according to the estimated
risk of attack at the time. If attack threatened, the mine squadron and
its destroyer escort would seek safety in the direction ordered by the
Support Commander; otherwise they would proceed on their mission and
return to base afterwards, according to the program for that occasion.
The destroyer escort would be of strength sufficient to ward off any
probable attack by submarines or by surface vessels that might elude the
supporting force and the regular patrols.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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