Rome -- History -- Tiberius, 14-37; Tiberius, Emperor of Rome 42 B.C.-37 A.D.
If the Roman people acquired a political significance in the later
days of the Republic only to show that it was an unmanageable part of
the constitution, the Roman Senate had always been an organized power.
Had it pursued the comparatively liberal policy which prevailed in
its councils immediately after the second Punic War, the Empire would
probably have come, but it might have come without the intervening
period of revolution; this, however, was not to be; the temptations of
wealth and power were too strong. While, however, we are at liberty
to condemn the Senate as it is revealed to us by the transactions
with Jugurtha and other scandalous incidents, we must not forget that
the same body which failed so deplorably at one period of its career
produced the men by whom the Empire was made. It was the embodiment
of all that was politically good in the Roman character, as well as
of much that was evil; its faults were the faults inherent to a close
corporation of nobles enjoying vast responsibilities which it did not
altogether comprehend; its virtues have impressed themselves upon
subsequent history.
A peculiarity of the Roman constitution in the later centuries of
the Republic is that it was practically unworkable even as a city
government, unless everybody was agreed to exercise forbearance,
and not to push constitutional powers to their legitimate extremes.
Two chief magistrates were elected every year, each of whom could
neutralize the work of the other; all public business could be stopped
at a moment’s notice on religious grounds; the magistrates elected by
the popular assembly could impose their veto upon the action of all
other magistrates. As long as the Senatorial families worked together,
and abandoned their mutual differences in the presence of external
pressure, the popular element in the constitution could be disregarded;
but when the Senate became divided against itself, or when individual
Senators chose to ignore the traditional checks by which the whole
body was enabled to work in the interests of the order rather than of
the individuals composing the order, it was possible to paralyze the
Government without departing from the strict letter of the constitution.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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