In the past we have seen the training done in a back-handed way: work in the higher units first, finally down to the company and soldier. This is so unlikely to occur in future that its evil results are not worth mentioning. [Sidenote: Time to close order drill] Too much time should not be devoted to close order drill, especially during the outdoor season. An hour a day for the first five or six drills and thereafter fifteen minutes a day is ample. There should always be, however, at least ten minutes a day of snappy, precise close order work; this together with the ceremonies will keep the companies up to the standard. Too much close order drill becomes monotonous; when that happens the command fails to improve even if it does not deteriorate. [Sidenote: Length of drills] The drills during the indoor season should be two hours long; for the rest of the year not less than three and generally from four to six hours daily. III FIRE SUPERIORITY We are told that in battle we must have fire superiority to win; and fire control and direction are held as important. I doubt if these terms are fully understood by all. A hope to aid some of our younger officers to a better understanding of these terms, and of the vital importance of fire distribution, is the excuse for this chapter. [Sidenote: Fire effectiveness in battle] A line of men firing with the rifle, if not disturbed or endangered by the fire of an enemy, can do approximately target practice work. Now let a heavy fire be opened on them, one that is fairly accurate and well placed, and their work falls off very greatly; the heavier the fire they are subjected to the less effective becomes their own fire. Careful study and research by competent men of foreign armies leads to the conclusion that if this line, when not under fire, could make 280 hits in a given time, subjected to a heavy, well placed fire its effectiveness would fall to 1/40 or 1/70; that is, from 280 hits to 7 or 4. [Sidenote: Fire effectiveness in battle] This looks extreme at first thought; but what captain with a good company but would know that he could deploy his company at from 800 to 1000 yards from a line of lying down figures and get a hit for at least every 10 shots. Yet history tells us that it takes from 1200 to 2000 shots in battle to put a man out of action. In the light of these facts our first figures look very moderate. With our present infantry arm an advance against a hostile line doing 280 work is impossible. Bring the enemy’s effectiveness down to the four and keep it there and you can advance and win. Fire superiority does not mean that you are firing more shots than the enemy, it does not mean he is firing less than you; it means that your fire has become so close and effective that he has lost his nerve and is shooting wildly. [Sidenote: Fire distribution]