Trench Warfare: A Manual for Officers and Men — John Shaqi
Trench Warfare: A Manual for Officers and MenSmith, Joseph S. (Joseph Shuter)
History
Trench Warfare: A Manual for Officers and Men
Smith, Joseph S. (Joseph Shuter)
Intrenchments; Siege warfare
This comprises the line of fire-trenches, with covering fire-trenches,
support trenches, support dugouts and reserve dugouts (in other words,
it is an exact duplication of the front line system), far enough behind
the front line that in the event of the first system being taken,
the second line is ready to be taken up by the troops driven out of
the front line, and receive the support of troops lying in brigade or
divisional reserve. The distance of the second line behind the first
is roughly a mile, and while the first line is held, operations of the
second often provide useful accommodation for the machine guns and
artillery, both for firing purposes, observation and shelter.
The time available for siting and constructing second line system, and
the freedom from all disturbances which bother the front line system,
should result in its being impregnable. It is an ideal system provided
those responsible for its siting and construction are thoroughly and
practically experienced with first line conditions and profit by that
experience and former mistakes.
COMMUNICATION TRENCHES
When siting communication trenches, two considerations come into
conflict with one another; the desire for protection, and the necessity
of rapid and easy transit. It is obvious that a C. T. is of vital
importance to the firing line in the getting up of supporting troops,
ammunition and stores rapidly and without undue fatigue. It is also
obvious that it must give as much protection as possible to the troops
using the C. T., but it must be recognized that the protection given
must not interfere with rapid transit by making the C. T. too narrow.
It must also be kept in mind that rapid transit in itself gives a
certain amount of protection for the simple reason that the easier and
quicker the transit, the less time are troops delayed in the C. T.’s in
which protection is required, and if troops can cover the danger area
in 10 minutes, they are plainly in danger for a less period than if it
took 30 minutes to struggle over that same area. This rapid transit,
only obtained by a dangerously wide communication trench from support
or reserve lines and from dugouts, also makes it possible for less
troops to be regularly on duty in the fire-trenches, which are always
uncomfortable and dangerous, especially during a bombardment, and it
also enables supports and reserves to be rushed up quickly when the
occasion demands.
It can be plainly seen now that a compromise must be effected between
claims of protection and rapid transit, so that the size and shape of
the C. T.’s will vary according to their distance from a danger area.
Generally speaking, the nearer to danger, the more must the claims of
rapid transit give way to those of protection.
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