And thus, after having laid down that the Act requires a proof of innocence in the party accused, a knowledge of something innocent intended--which, if not given, must leave the inference of guilty knowledge, inasmuch as _no knowledge_, ignorance of the object, cannot be taken as an answer--the accused, if he cannot produce his correspondent, or if he did not possess himself at the time of making the shipment, of a plain and simple account of his plans, is left to the mercy of such inferences as may be drawn; and upon this view of the requirements of the Act of Parliament he is to be considered as withholding something which cannot be supposed to be favourable to him. This inference will not be counterbalanced--it cannot be when once admitted; it must either be destroyed by the plain and simple account of what the merchant abroad intended, or its edge will be blunted by nothing else. The accused’s character may be “of the very highest,” perfectly unassailable; the position he occupies in the mercantile profession may be very high, the profession itself in this country being reckoned on a level for honour and principle with the highest; and men of unblameable character, of considerable standing and independence, conscientious and upright, moving in society where good taste and right feeling prevail, are not likely to put their property, their character, their consciences, in jeopardy, especially by partaking in transactions to which their habits and feelings, and those of persons around them, stand opposed, and all that for very paltry advantage. It is pointed out by the learned Judge, that although a very grave charge, and of a very highly penal nature, still the slave trade--the dealing in slaves--“is a trade, which till a recent period was lawful for persons in this country, and many persons of very good character certainly did engage in that trade, and a great number of persons justified it. I suppose,” he continues, “those same persons would now say it is not to be engaged in, because it is a prohibited thing--it is a regulation of trade enforced by very severe penalties made by this country--but that the dealing in slaves is in itself a lawful, right, good, and proper thing, which ought not to be prohibited. Those persons would now consider slave trading as a thing prohibited only by positive regulations. There is no one who does not at once perceive that practical distinction between them. There is no person who, in point of feeling and opinion, does not perceive the difference there is between a thing which is prohibited by positive law, and that kind of thing, against which, if there were no law at all against it, the plain natural sense and conscience of mankind would revolt. This trading in slaves, in the opinion of a great many persons, is itself an abomination, a thing which ought to be considered with the greatest horror, whether prohibited or not; but those who think it was