Upon this the learned Judge remarks:--“That Zulueta & Co. stand in a very different situation from that of a person who is simply the manufacturer or dealer in goods, and who has those goods ordered, and who, inquiring Where shall I send them? is answered, Send them on board the ‘Augusta,’ now lying at Liverpool. It would be a strong thing from that circumstance to infer that a person sending those goods on board had any thing to do with slave trading; but that appears not to be the nature of this transaction. In regard to there being a slave trading, all that is done, is done by Zulueta & Co. It is not merely that they had goods sent on board the ship, but they chose the number of the goods to be sent on board the ship, goods which they had bought, for which they had negotiated; and they made out such charter-party, and that charter-party provides that the ship shall proceed to Gallinas on the coast of Africa.” In the case of the manufacturer of the goods, described as receiving an order and executing it, and shipping the goods on board a vessel for the Gallinas, it would be _strong_ to infer that he had any thing to do with the slave trade. Why so, but because every one of these acts is compatible with ignorance of the objects that are or may be intended? Now, the learned Judge had previously established that the acts of buying and shipping, chartering, and dispatching, are not necessarily in themselves conclusive of guilt, which of course they are not; how, then, is the inapplicability of the comparison put by the counsel for the defence to be maintained, but by laying down the principle, that for the purpose of a defence under this charge, the commission-agent must, at all events, be required to be possessed of, and therefore to be able to give, a plain and simple account of what the merchant abroad intended; and this once laid down, nothing that comes short of it must be suffered to tell in his favour.