_Mr. Evarts_: My learned friend is certainly right in saying that the crime was completed when the Joseph was seized; but it does not follow that the proof of what the crime was, and what the nature of the act was, is completed by the termination of that particular transaction. You might as well say that the fact of a robbery or theft has been completed by a pickpocket or highwayman when his victim has been despoiled of his property; and that proof of the crime prohibits the Government from showing the conduct of the alleged culprit after the transaction--such as evading the officer, running away from or resisting the officer. _The Court_: You do not take into account the admission of the counsel. I believe the subsequent conduct of the privateers, if the intent with which they seized and captured the Joseph was in question, would be admissible; but when this is admitted broadly by the counsel for the defendants, I do not see why it is necessary to go into proof with a view to make out that fact, except to occupy the time of the Court. _Mr. Evarts_: I am sure your honor will not impute to us any such motive. The point of difficulty is: my learned friends do not admit the completeness of the crime by all the prisoners, subject only to the answer whether the privateering character of the enterprise protects them. The moment that is admitted, I have no occasion to dwell upon the facts. _The Court_: I understand the admission as covering all the prisoners, as to the intent. _Mr. Brady_: That she was fitted out as a privateer--the enterprise, and capture of the Joseph. _Mr. Smith_: Is the admission that all were engaged in a common enterprise, and all participators in the fact? _The Court_: So I understand the admission, without any qualification. _Mr. Smith_: Do we understand the counsel as assenting to the Court's interpretation as to the breadth of the admission?