[22] USMC, MarCorps Board, _An Evaluation of the Influence of Marine Corps Forces on the Course of the Korean War_ (4 Aug 50–15 Dec 50), v. I, I-B-1. (Hereafter, MarCorps Board _Study_.) Thus was history made without pomp or ceremony during the conference at FECOM Headquarters. The date was 10 July, but it was already D-minus 67 for thousands of American young men. On farms and in offices, in cities and villages from coast to coast, these civilians had no inkling that just 67 days later they would be fighting their way ashore in a major amphibious operation. For they were Marine reservists, and the 1st Marine Division could not be brought up to full strength without calling them back into uniform. Shepherd realized, even while assuring MacArthur that the division could be made combat-ready by 15 September, that the activation of the Brigade had left the division with less than the strength of a single RCT. Nearly as many men would be required to bring it up to full strength as were contained at present in the entire Fleet Marine Force.[23] But so great was his confidence in the Marine Corps Reserve that he did not hesitate to take the responsibility. [23] For statistics on Reserve mobilization, see Ernest H. Giusti, _The Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve in the Korean Conflict_. (HistBr, G-3 HQMC, 1952). (Hereafter, Giusti.) Nor did MacArthur lose any time at making up his mind. That very day, 10 July, he sent his first request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a Marine division. As the conference ended, Shepherd found the UN supreme commander “enthusiastic” about the prospect of employing again the Marine outfit that had been his reliance seven years before in the New Britain operation. He planned to stabilize the front in Korea as soon as possible, he said, as a prelude to the landing in the NKPA rear which he believed would be decisive.[24] [24] CG FMFPac memo to CMC, 11 Jul 50. _America’s Force-in-Readiness_ Long before the New Britain landing, Cates and Shepherd had learned from first-hand experience as junior officers how decisive a force-in-readiness can be. The lieutenant from Tennessee and the lieutenant from Virginia took part in June 1918 with the Marines who stopped the Germans by counterattacking at Belleau Wood. In terms of human tonnage, two Marine regiments did not cut much of a figure in the American Expeditionary Force. What counted was the _readiness_ of the Marines and a few outfits of U. S. Army regulars at a time when most of the American divisions had not yet finished training.