U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 2 (of 5): The Inchon-Seoul OperationMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 2 (of 5): The Inchon-Seoul Operation
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
“Info addressee (X Corps TacAir Commander) reports enemy fleeing city
of Seoul on road north of Uijongbu.... He [TacAir] is conducting
heavy air attack and will continue same. You will push attack now to
the limit of your objectives in order to insure maximum destruction of
enemy forces. Signed Almond.”[417]
[417] O. P. Smith, _Notes_, 288–289.
The Division G-3 immediately called the Corps G-3 for corroboration.
Colonel Bowser questioned the ability of night air observation to
determine whether the movement out of the city consisted of urban
refugees or enemy troops. He was informed, however, that the intention
of Corps was for the attack to begin at once.
General Smith then called the X Corps chief of staff for confirmation,
pointing out the inadvisability of attacking at night in an unfamiliar
Oriental city of the size and complexity of Seoul, particularly as
there was no indication of the enemy fleeing from the Division front.
But General Ruffner replied that General Almond himself had dictated
the message and it was to be executed without delay.[418]
[418] _Ibid._
General Smith gave the attack order to the commanding officers of the
1st and 5th Marines, directing them to coordinate their efforts and
confine them to avenues of advance which could be identified at night.
His order was receipted by the 1st Marines at 2205 and the 5th Marines
at 2215 just a few hours after the NKPA counterattack hit the 3d
Battalion of Murray’s regiment.
While the two rifle regiments made preparations to jump off, the order
was relayed to the 7th and 11th Marines. Colonel Puller coordinated
hastily with the 5th Marines and supporting arms for an attack
scheduled to begin at 0145 on 26 September, following a 15-minute
artillery preparation.[419]
[419] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter, Queen Queen;
MarCorps Board _Study_, II-B, 38–39.
At 0138, deciding that the preparation was inadequate, he notified the
assault battalions to “stand fast, preparatory fires to be repeated.” A
new jump-off time of 0200 was set, but at 0153 a dramatic interruption
came in the form of a flash message from the 3d Battalion of the 1st
Marines. Lieutenant Colonel Ridge reported that a heavy enemy attack,
supported by tanks and self-propelled guns, was moving down the main
avenue leading from the center of the city to the southwest in the zone
of the 1st Marines.[420]
[420] 1st MarDiv _SAR_, Annex Peter Peter.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account