And even this ambitious undertaking was not the whole show. For a joint operation was to be carried out meanwhile by Eighth Army forces thrusting northward from the Pusan Perimeter to form a junction with the units of the Inchon-Seoul drive. This double-barreled assault, it was believed, would shatter North Korean resistance and put an end to the war. _Inception of X Corps_ The time, the place, the landing force, the main objectives--these essentials of the proposed Inchon-Seoul operation had been pretty well settled, at least to General MacArthur’s satisfaction, by the first week of August. But even though he had his assault troops, there was as yet no headquarters organization. Admiral Sherman urged early in August that the commander in chief call upon General Shepherd and the facilities of the FMFPac organization at Pearl Harbor. Since there was so little time left before D-day--only a fraction of the time usually allotted to the planning phase of a major ship to shore assault--he felt that amphibious know-how and experience were required. He proposed, therefore, that steps be taken to obtain the approval of Admiral Radford, who had jurisdiction over FMFPac. The need for a headquarters organization was discussed on 7 August by the Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG) of FECOM. Brigadier General Wright, G-3 of FECOM, received a memorandum from the other members of the staff recommending that the gap be filled in one of two ways--either by putting into effect Admiral Sherman’s plan, or by sponsoring the organization of a provisional corps headquarters. General Wright favored the first course of action, as did Brigadier General Doyle G. Hickey, FECOM deputy chief of staff. Ultimately, however, the FECOM chief of staff decided in favor of the latter command arrangement.[68] [68] OCMH, Dept of Army (Maj J. F. Schnabel), _The Korean Conflict_ (MS), v. I, ch. I. _Final Conference on Inchon_ The questions of _when_ and _where_ and _who_ had been answered to some extent. But as late as 23 August, a good many variations of opinion existed as to _how_ the amphibious assault was to be accomplished. The natural obstacles of the Inchon harbor area were so disturbing that Doyle suggested an alternative to MacArthur and Almond. Since the purpose of the landing was to drive inland and cut the enemy’s communications, urged ComPhibGru One, why not select a west coast objective with fewer hydrographic difficulties? He proposed the Posung-Myon area, about 30 miles south of Inchon on the west coast, where better approach channels and beaches were believed to be available in a more lightly populated locality. A landing at this point, Doyle contended, would not be attended by the risks and restrictions of Inchon, yet after securing a beachhead the troops would be in position to strike inland at the enemy’s main line of rail and highway communications in the vicinity of Osan.[69]