U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 2 (of 5): The Inchon-Seoul OperationMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 2 (of 5): The Inchon-Seoul Operation
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
[69] O. P. Smith, _Chronicle_, 23 Aug 50, _Notes_, 51–52.
A _myon_ is comparable to our county, being a Korean
political subdivision containing several towns or
villages.
Smith was favorably impressed. He brought up the subject on 23 August,
when he and Barr had a meeting with Almond. The X Corps commander did
not concur, though conceding that Posung-Myon had possibilities as an
area for a subsidiary landing in connection with the Inchon assault.
Nor was Doyle able to obtain MacArthur’s consent to the alternate
objective.
It was the Marine general’s third conference of the day. From the X
Corps meeting he had gone directly to the regular conference at GHQ,
and thence to the talk with Almond and Barr. He came away from all
three meetings with the conviction that CinCFE and his staff were
not to be swerved by his objections. It was definitely to be Inchon
on 15 September, and Smith instructed his planning group to proceed
accordingly.
Doyle made a last attempt at 1730 that afternoon to present a
comprehensive picture of the risks and difficulties inherent at Inchon.
This final conference on the subject of a west coast landing was
attended by some of the nation’s highest ranking officers--General J.
Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff; Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief
of Naval Operations; General Shepherd, CG FMFPac; Lieutenant General
Idwal H. Edwards, U. S. Air Force; as well as other high-ranking
staff officers who had flown out from Washington. It was no secret in
Tokyo military circles that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were present
for the purpose of studying General MacArthur’s plans for the Inchon
landing. It was also generally known that doubts and misgivings had
been expressed at various times when the project was discussed at the
Pentagon. General Collins stated candidly at a later date that the
purpose of his Tokyo visit was “... to find out exactly what the plans
were. Frankly, we were somewhat in the dark, and as it was a matter of
great concern, we went out to discuss it with General MacArthur. We
suggested certain alternate possibilities and places....”[70]
[70] MacArthur Hearings, 1295, quoted by Major Schnabel in
_The Korean Conflict_ (MS), v. I, ch. I.
Admirals Joy and Doyle also attended the meeting, and FECOM was
represented by Generals Almond, Ruffner, and Wright. The conference
room on the sixth floor of the Dai Ichi building proved too small
for the audience, and members of the PhibGru One team had to wait
their turn in Almond’s adjoining office. One by one, at eight-minute
intervals, Doyle’s officers took turns at being presented to MacArthur,
who listened gravely while puffing at his pipe. The following
amphibious specialists were heard:
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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