Cdr Edmund S. L. Marshall, USN Navigation Lt Charles R. Barron, USN Aerology LtCol William E. Benedict, USMC Military Aspects LCdr Jack L. Lowentrout, USN Beach Study LCdr M. Ted Jacobs, Jr., USN Seabees Pontoon Causeway Plans LCdr Clyde E. Allmon, USN Ship to Shore Plans LCdr Arlie G. Capps, USN Gunfire Support Cdr Theophilus H. Moore, USN Air Support[71] [71] The description of the conference has been derived from: LCdr Frank A. Manson (USN) interv, 22 Apr 52; Capt Walter Karig (USNR), _et al._, _Battle Report: The War in Korea_ (New York, 1952), 165–168 (hereafter, Karig, _Korea_); VAdm Arthur D. Struble ltr to authors, 25 Apr 55. The officers spoke of the natural obstacles. They asserted that it would be the peak of optimism to hope for a strategic surprise at Inchon, for the enemy also knew that only a few days each autumn month offered a tidal range sufficient to float the landing craft and supply ships over the mud flats of the harbor. They contended that even a tactical surprise was out of the question, since Wolmi-do must be neutralized before landings could be made on the mainland. Otherwise, the vulnerable column of landing craft would be exposed to a slaughter from the flanking fire of the island’s guns. The Navy group pointed out further that it must also be assumed that the enemy would not neglect a good opportunity to sow both moored and magnetic mines in the channels the shipping must take. And to cap all the other natural and man-made risks, there was danger at the height of the typhoon season that Nature would intervene and scatter the amphibious armada during its approach to the objective area. The presentation lasted for nearly an hour and a half. At the conclusion, Admiral Doyle summed up by giving his opinion. “The best I can say,” he told the commander in chief, “is that Inchon is not impossible.”