Following CinCUNC’s meeting in the capitol building on the 29th, General Almond called a conference of division commanders and staff members at his X Corps Headquarters in Ascom City, near Inchon. MacArthur’s strategy was outlined to the assembled officers, so that planning could commence on the division level. Almond set 15 October as D-Day for the Wonsan landing. He based this target date on the assumption that Eighth Army would pass through and relieve X Corps on 3 October, the date on which the necessary shipping was to begin arriving at Inchon.[28] [28] 1stMarDiv _Special Action Report for the Wonsan-Hamhung-Chosin Reservoir Operation, 8 Oct-15 Dec 50_ (hereafter 1stMarDiv _SAR_), 10. On 29 September, the 1st Marine Division was still committed tactically above Seoul, two regiments blocking and one attacking. If the first vessels began arriving at Inchon on 3 October, the assault shipping would not be completely assembled until the 8th, according to the JSPOG estimate. Four days would be required to get to the objective, leaving two days, instead of the planned six, for outloading the landing force. Neither Major General Oliver P. Smith, Commanding General (CG) 1stMarDiv, nor his staff regarded this as a realistic schedule.[29] [29] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, 10 and MajGen Oliver P. Smith, _Notes on the Operations of the 1st Marine Division during the First Nine Months of the Korean War, 1950–51_ (MS), (hereafter Smith, _Notes_), 370–371. [Illustration: AREA OF OPERATIONS 1st Marine Division October-December 1950 MAP-2 ] The Marine officers came away from the conference without knowledge of the types and numbers of ships that would be made available to the division. And since they had no maps of the objective area and no intelligence data whatever, it was manifestly impossible to lay firm plans along either administrative or tactical lines.[30] [30] _Ibid._ Vice Admiral Joy, Commander Naval Forces Far East (ComNavFE), issued his instructions on 1 October in connection with the forthcoming operations. To Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble’s Joint Task Force 7 (JTF-7), which had carried out the Inchon attack, he gave these missions: 1. To maintain a naval blockade of Korea’s East coast south of Chongjin. 2. To furnish naval gunfire and air support to Eighth Army as directed. 3. To conduct pre-D-Day naval operations for the Wonsan landing as required. 4. To load and transport X Corps to Wonsan, providing cover and support en route. 5. To seize by amphibious assault, occupy, and defend a beachhead in the Wonsan area on D-Day. 6. To provide naval gunfire, air, and initial logistical support to X Corps at Wonsan until relieved.[31] [31] ComNavFE _OpnPlan 113-50_. Copy at OCMH.