But the plans for off-loading the 7th Division could not be revised. If the Army unit was to land within a reasonable length of time, it would have to go in on the heels of the 1st Marine Division, using the same landing craft. If the ship-to-shore movement took place at Hungnam, the 7th Division would be ill-disposed for beginning its overland drive to Pyongyang as planned; for it would have to backtrack by land almost all the way to Wonsan. On the other hand, if the Army division landed at Wonsan while the Marines assaulted Hungnam, the Navy would be handicapped not only by the lack of landing craft but also by the problem of sweeping mines from both harbors simultaneously. From the standpoint of Admiral Joy in Japan and Admiral Doyle in Korea, there was insufficient time for planning a new tactical deployment of X Corps at this late date. And the time-space handicap would be compounded by serious shortages of mine sweepers and intelligence information. Joy was unsuccessful on 8 October in his first attempt to dissuade MacArthur from the new idea. On the 9th, unofficial word of the pending change reached General Smith at Inchon, just as his staff wound up work on the draft for the Wonsan assault. ComNavFE persisted in his arguments with the commander in chief, however, with the final result that on 10 October the original plan for landing the whole X Corps at Wonsan was ordered into effect.[49] Coming events were to uphold the Navy viewpoint; for while the Wonsan landing itself was delayed several days by enemy mines, it was 15 November before the first ships safely entered the harbor at Hungnam.[50] [49] C/S Notes in X Corps _WD_ 10–25 Oct 50; ComPhibGruOne, “Report of ... Operations ... 25 Jun 50 to 1 Jan 51,” 11; Smith, _Chronicle_, 57–59; and Capt Walter Karig, _et al_, _Battle Report_: _The War In Korea_ (New York, 1952), 301–302. According to Gen Wright, MacArthur’s G-3, “Admiral Joy may have ‘discussed’ this often with the Commander-in-Chief, but no one ever ‘argued’ with him.” Wright ltr 16 Feb 56. [50] ComNavFE msg to CinCFE, 0010 12 Nov 50. _Marine Loading and Embarkation_ On 11 October, the day after he opened his CP on the _Mount McKinley_, General Smith learned that the Hungnam plan had been dropped. The 1st Marine Division continued loading out in accordance with X Corps OpnO 4, even though its objective had already been captured.[51] [51] Smith, _Chronicle_, 59. During the period 4–10 October, Admiral Doyle had assembled at Inchon an assortment of Navy amphibious vessels, ships of the Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS), and Japanese-manned LSTs (SCAJAP).[52] With the arrival of Transport Squadron One on 8 October, the total shipping assigned to the landing force consisted of one AGC, eight APAs, two APs, 10 AKAs, five LSDs, 36 LSTs, three LSUs, one LSM, and six commercial cargo vessels (“Victory” and C-2 types).[53]