[52] ComPhibGruOne “Operations Report,” 10. SCAJAP is the abbreviation for Shipping Control Authority, Japan. Under this designation were American ships lent to Japan after World War II, of which many were recalled during the Korean War to serve as cargo vessels. [53] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex D (hereafter G-4 _SAR_), 2. Loading a reinforced division, several thousand Corps troops and thousands of tons of supplies and equipment proved to be an aggravating job under the circumstances. Pressure on the attack and landing forces for an early D-Day only magnified the shortcomings of Inchon as a port. Limited facilities and unusual tide conditions held dock activity to a series of feverish bursts. Moreover, many ships not part of the amphibious force had to be accommodated since they were delivering vital materiel. The assigned shipping itself was inadequate, according to the Division G-4 and “considerable quantities” of vehicles had to be left behind. Much of the trucking that could be taken was temporarily diverted to help transport the 7th Infantry Division to Pusan; and although unavailable for port operations when needed, it returned at the last minute to disrupt outloading of the Shore Party’s heavy beach equipment.[54] Out of conditions and developments such as these grew the necessity for postponing D-Day from 15 October, the date initially set by General Almond, to the 20th. [54] _Ibid._, 3. For purposes of expediting embarkation and economizing on shipping space, X Corps directed the 1st Marine Division to out-load with less than the usual amount of supplies carried by a landing force.[55] Resupply shipping would be so scheduled as to deliver adequate stocks of Class I, II, III, and IV consumables “... prior to the time they would be needed,” even though when “they would be needed” was anybody’s guess at this stage of the war.[56] [55] These totals were authorized: C-Rations for five days; individual assault rations for one day; POL for five days; Class II and IV supplies for 15 days; and five units of fire (U/F). _Ibid._; 1stMarDiv _Administrative Order_ (_AdmO_) 13-50, 8 Oct 50. A unit of fire is a convenient yardstick in describing large quantities of ammunition. It is based on a specific number of rounds per weapon. [56] G-4 _SAR_, 1. In anticipation of a rapid advance to the west (which did not materialize), Division G-4 not only assigned 16 pre-loaded trucks and trailers to each RCT, but also earmarked three truck companies and 16 more trailers as a mobile logistical reserve. These supply trains would stay on the heels of the attacking regiments in order to maintain ammunition dumps as far forward as possible in a fast-moving situation.[57] [57] _Ibid._, 3.