U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir CampaignMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
[633] ComNavFE endorsement on CG FMFPac ser 8432, 6 Dec 50.
“Although it was not necessary for me to exercise my
command functions,” commented General Shepherd, “I had
been orally directed to do so by both Admirals Radford
and Joy if I considered it expedient. As I recall,
I was directed to take charge of the naval phase of
the evacuation of Hungnam as Representative of the
Commander, Naval Forces, Far East. In compliance with
these instructions I exercised close overall supervision
of this phase of the operation and made suggestions to
both Admiral Doyle and General Almond relative to the
embarkation and evacuation of the Marine Forces from
Hungnam.” Shepherd ltr, 25 Oct 56.
General Almond was directed on the 9th to redeploy to South Korea and
to report to the commanding general of the Eighth Army after assembling
in the Ulsan-Pusan-Masan area. He was to release the 1st ROK Corps as
soon as possible to the ROK Army in the Samchok area. An assembly area
in the vicinity of Masan, widely separated from the other units of X
Corps, was specified for the 1st Marine Division.
CTF-90 was assigned the following missions:
(1) Provide water lift for and conduct redeployment operations of
UN forces in Korea as directed;
(2) Control all air and naval gunfire support in designated
embarkation areas;
(3) Protect shipping en route to debarkation ports;
(4) Be responsible for naval blockade and gunfire support of
friendly units East Coast of Korea, including Pusan;
(5) Be prepared to conduct small-scale redeployment operations,
including ROK forces and UN prisoners of war;
(6) Coordinate withdrawal operations with CG X Corps and other
commands as appropriate;
(7) Support and cover redeployment operations in the Hungnam or
other designated Korean embarkation area.
No such large-scale sea lift of combined Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marine elements, not to mention the ROK units, had been attempted since
Okinawa. The time was so short, moreover, that action could not wait on
detailed planning and organization. In any event the job had to be done.
An enormous fleet of shipping must be assembled from every available
source in the Far East. More than 100,000 troops must be embarked,
and it was estimated at first that 25,000 Korean refugees must be
evacuated, though this figure had to be nearly quadrupled. Mountains
of supplies and thousands of vehicles must be outloaded from a
comparatively small port. While these activities were in progress, the
perimeter must be protected with naval gunfire and aircraft against
an enemy credited by X Corps G-2 estimates with the capabilities of
launching an attack of six to eight depleted divisions against the
Hamhung-Hungnam area.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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