U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir CampaignMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
It was at a X Corps staff meeting on 18 October that General Almond
disclosed MacArthur’s plan for parallel zones of action and the
new Chongsanjansi-Songjin restraining line in North Korea. Upon
establishing his CP at Wonsan two days later, he accordingly assumed
command of all UN and ROK forces north of the 39° 10′ parallel and
east of the Taebaek Range.[101]
[101] CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps _WD_, 10–25 Oct 50.
By this time the ROK Capitol Division was occupying Hamhung, Hungnam,
and nearby Yonpo Airfield, all of which had been captured on 17
October during the swift drive northward.[102] The ROK 3d Division had
one regiment at Wonsan, another at Kojo, and the third en route to
Hamhung.[103]
[102] EUSAK _WD_, 23 Oct 50.
[103] X Corps _WD_, 10–25 Oct 50.
On the 21st, General Almond requested CJTF-7 to land one battalion
of Marines at Kojo immediately, for the purpose of relieving the ROK
regiment defending that locale. He contended that Navy LSTs could beach
there safely, since SCAJAP ships had already done so. Learning of the
proposed landing, Admiral Doyle argued against it and Admiral Struble
forbade it on the ground that the military requirement did not justify
the risk incident to negotiating unswept waters. Thus the landing was
called off, although the Marines had not heard the last of Kojo.[104]
[104] “Summary of Activities, 21 Oct,” in _Ibid._;
ComPhibGruOne “Operations Report,” 13; Smith, _Notes_,
404–407; Struble Comments, 14 Mar 56.
On 22 October, General Smith issued a new plan based on the proposed X
Corps deployment as far north as the Chongsanjangsi-Songjin line. The
1st Marine Division would now occupy the southern part of the extended
corps zone, with each regiment responsible for the security of its
assigned sector.[105] But again planning went for naught when, two
days later, General Almond received MacArthur’s order to disregard the
restraining line and use whatever forces necessary to drive rapidly
to the Manchurian and Soviet borders. On 25 October, therefore, X
Corps directed the 1st Marine Division to concentrate one RCT in the
Hamhung area and to relieve elements of the I ROK Corps at the Chosin
and Fusen Reservoirs. South Korean troops had already begun their
advance on these vital power centers, some 50 to 60 air miles north of
Hamhung.[106]
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