Upon the completion of mine sweeping in the inner harbor, the intact port facilities of Wonsan became operative on 2 November. During the next nine days, the Combat Service Group dispatched by rail to Hamhung 3900 tons of ammunition alone. On 9 November, the group was attached to X Corps for operational control, thereafter assuming specific responsibility for such varied tasks as: operation of all port facilities; unloading all X Corps elements; transporting all equipment and supplies to inland dumps and supply points; casualty evacuation; maintenance of an airhead at Wonsan Airfield; providing local security; traffic control in the port and its environs; and providing field maintenance for all units in the Wonsan area. The magnitude of the logistical operation can be imagined from a survey of statistics mentioned in Shore Party reports. By 31 October, when the 1st Marine Division’s landing was completed, a total of 24 cargo vessels, 36 LSTs, and one LSM had been unloaded. Bulk cargo in the order of 18,402 tons had moved across the beaches along with 30,189 personnel and 4731 vehicles. During the same period, 2534 troops were outloaded with 70 vehicles and 4323 POWs. And in November, as the MAG-12 elements and the rest of X Corps poured ashore, the total of ships handled soared to 76 cargo and 52 LSTs, adding 30,928 personnel, 51,270 tons of supplies, and 7113 vehicles to the short-lived build-up in Northeast Korea. CHAPTER III First Blood At Kojo _1/1 Sent to Kojo--Marine Positions in Kojo Area--The All-Night Fight of Baker Company--2/1 Ordered to Kojo--Security Provided for Wonsan Area--Marines Relieved at Kojo_ It was perhaps inevitable after the NKPA collapse that an end-of-the-war atmosphere should prevail. This attitude was found in the CP as well as the foxhole. General MacArthur, while witnessing the Eighth Army paratroop landings north of the captured enemy capital, was quoted by the newspapers as saying: The war is very definitely coming to an end shortly. With the closing of that trap there should be an end to organized resistance.[116] [116] _Newsweek_, xxxiv, no. 18 (30 Oct 50), 30. As another straw in the wind, General Smith had received a dispatch from ComNavFE on 21 October which stated that on the conclusion of hostilities it was his intention to recommend to CinCFE that the 1st Marine Division be returned to the United States, less an RCT to be stationed in Japan.[117] [117] Smith, _Notes_, 403; Col A. L. Bowser, Comments, n. d. See also FMFPac Staff Study: “The Establishment of a Balanced Fleet Marine Force Air-Ground Force in the Western Pacific,” 19 Oct 50.