U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir Campaign — John Shaqi
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir CampaignMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
On the 24th the Marine commander learned that X Corps had received
a document, for planning purposes only, providing that the Corps
commander would become commander of the occupation forces. These were
to consist of a single American division, probably the 3d Infantry
Division, while the remainder of the Eighth Army returned to Japan.[118]
[118] Smith, _Notes_, 403.
Such indications seemed less reassuring after an incident which
occurred at Wonsan on the evening of D-day. Two Marines, gathering
firewood on the beach, had been blown to pieces by a booby trap. They
were the only casualties from enemy action in the Wonsan landing.[119]
[119] CG 1stMarDiv msg to subordinate units, 2001 27 Oct 50.
Firewood being scarce in Korea, it was sometimes booby
trapped.
As early as 24 October the Marine division CP aboard the _Mount
McKinley_ had been advised of an ancillary mission. Immediately
following the landing one battalion was to be sent 39 miles south of
Wonsan to the small seaport of Kojo. There it was to protect a supply
dump of the ROK I Corps.[120]
[120] Smith, _Notes_, 385; 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex C (hereafter
G-3 _SAR_), 5. The assignment went to 1/1. See Col J.
Hawkins ltr to CMC, n. d., and LtCol R. E. Lorigan ltr to
CMC, 8 Feb 56 for a discussion of the lack of planning
and intelligence resulting from this order being received
while underway.
X Corps issued OI 13 on the 25th but General Smith did not receive
his copy until two days later. Corps orders now assigned the Marine
division a zone of action more than 300 road miles from north to south
and 50 road miles in width. The missions prescribed for the Marines
were those of an occupation rather than a fighting force:
(1) To land on beaches in the vicinity of Wonsan.
(2) To relieve all elements of I ROK Corps in Kojo and zone.
(3) To protect the Wonsan-Kojo-Majon-ni area, employing not less
than one RCT, and patrolling all roads to the west in zone.
(4) To advance rapidly in zone to the Korean northern border.
(5) To be prepared to land one Battalion Landing Team (BLT) in
the Chongjin area rapidly on order.
(6) To assist the 101st Engineer Group (C) (ROK) in the repair of
the Yonghung-Hamhung railroad, employing not less than one
engineer company.[121]
[121] Smith, _Notes_, 393–394; G-3 _SAR_, 5–6.
The 1st Marine Division in turn assigned these tasks to the following
units in OpnO 18-50, issued at 0800 on the 28th but communicated orally
to most of the designated commanding officers during the preceding 48
hours:
(1) RCT-1 to relieve elements of I ROK Corps in
Wonsan-Kojo-Majon-ni zone, establish necessary road blocks
to prevent movement into the area, patrol roads, and destroy
enemy in zone. RCT-1 to maintain one reinforced battalion at
Kojo until further orders.
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