U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir CampaignMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 3 (of 5): The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
It was an ironical circumstance that the ROKs on the overcrowded train
took with them the remnants of the supply dump that 1/1 was assigned to
guard. However important this dump may have been in its heyday, it had
apparently been consumed by the ROKs to the point where only a few
drums of fuel oil remained along with other odds and ends.
[Illustration: KOJO AREA
Unit locations are those of 1700
27 Oct 50
MAP-4
]
That afternoon the train and truck convoys arrived without incident,
bringing supplies and all reinforcing units except the artillery. And
though the Marines at Kojo did not neglect security precautions, they
had seen nothing during their first 24 hours to hint that an organized
enemy was about to launch a surprise attack.
_Marine Positions in Kojo Area_
Lieutenant Colonel Hawkins faced a problem in selecting positions for
his battalion.
Mindful of my mission--to protect the supply dump until removed--I
had to dispose the battalion in a way designated to accomplish this
end [he commented]. The supply dump was located at the railroad
station in the flat ground south of Kojo--a point difficult to
defend, since it was on low ground and could be approached by the
enemy from any direction. I considered the most likely direction
of enemy approach to be from the south along the coastal road
or through the valley leading toward Kojo from the southwest.
Therefore, I decided to place Company B in outpost positions to
cover these approaches.... The remainder of the battalion would be
deployed on the hill massif west of Kojo, prepared to defend the
area or counterattack if necessary to prevent loss of the supplies
at the railroad station. I did not consider this disposition
ideal by any means from the standpoint of defensive strength, but
it appeared to be the best possible disposition in the complex
terrain to protect the supply dump.... Also, I did not have reason
to expect an organized attack by large enemy forces. In the event
such a contingency should occur, it was planned that Company B, the
outpost, would withdraw to the main battle position.[125]
[125] Hawkins ltr, n. d. It should be remembered that Hawkins
made his dispositions before learning that the ROKs had
taken the supply dump with them.
Captain Wesley B. Noren’s Baker Company positions were about two miles
south and southwest of Kojo across an expanse of rice paddies. From
east to west the company held three isolated points of high ground:
1st Platoon (First Lieutenant George S. Belli), reinforced by one
section of light machine guns and one 3.2″ rocket launcher squad, on
the east slope of Hill 109;
3d Platoon (Master Sergeant Matthew D. Monk) and Company Headquarters,
reinforced by one section of heavy machine guns, one section of light
machine guns, a 75mm recoilless rifle, one squad of 3.5″ rocket
launchers and a flame thrower, on high ground to the west and south of
the 1st Platoon;
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