2d Platoon (First Lieutenant George G. Chambers), reinforced by one section of 81mm mortars, one section of light machine guns, a 75mm recoilless rifle and one squad of 3.2″ rocket launchers, on Hill 185. The remainder of 1/1 occupied positions west of Kojo. Captain Robert P. Wray’s Charlie Company held a continuous line of foxholes in the hills that rose from the rice paddies a mile and a half north of Baker Company’s positions. From west to east were First Lieutenant Francis B. Conlon’s 2d Platoon, First Lieutenant William A. Craven’s 1st and Second Lieutenant Henry A. Commiskey’s 3d. About 250 yards to the east were two platoons of Captain Robert H. Barrow’s Able Company. On the slopes north of Barrow stood Colonel Hawkins’ CP and the tubes of First Lieutenant Edward E. Kaufer’s 4.2″ Mortar Platoon. Captain Barrow’s third platoon occupied the topographical crest of Hill 117.[126] [126] Maj W. C. Noren, Report of 27–28 Oct 50, revised and annotated in ltr to authors, 22 Nov 55; (hereafter Noren rpt); Bridges interv, 4 Nov 55; Barrow interv, 27 Oct 55; Maj R. P. Wray ltr to CMC, 24 Jan 56. While the Marines organized their positions during the afternoon of 27 October, a column of refugees “almost as long as the eye could see” appeared in the valley southwest of Kojo headed for the seaport. Colonel Hawkins estimated that there were 2000 to 3000 people in the column. Since he did not have the time to examine all the refugees before darkness, Hawkins had them herded into the peninsula northeast of Kojo for the night.[127] [127] Hawkins ltr, n. d. After a quiet afternoon on the 27th, the first hint of enemy opposition came at 1600 when a wire team was fired upon in the vicinity of Hill 185. Two hours later a truck and a jeep borrowed from the S-3, Major David W. Bridges, received fire from the high ground west of Hill 109. Both were abandoned after the truck broke down, and a Baker Company patrol had a brief fire fight at 1900 when it recovered the vehicles.[128] [128] 1stMar _HD, Oct 50_, encl 2, 1; Noren rpt; Bridges interv 4 Nov 55. These first indications of Red Korean activity in the Kojo area were attributed to the forays of guerrilla bands. Not until after the battle did the Marines learn from POW interrogations that the enemy consisted of an estimated 1000 to 1200 men of the 10th Regiment, 5th NKPA Division. This regiment, commanded by Colonel Cho Il Kwon, former director of the Communist Party at Wonsan, was believed to have its CP in the large village of Tongchon, about two miles south of the Baker Company outposts. Other units of the NKPA division, which was credited with a total strength of 7000 to 8000 men, occupied areas farther to the south.[129] [129] 1/1 telephone call (tel) to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1415 28 Oct 50; G-2 X Corps Rpt in G-3 Journal, X Corps _WD_, 29 Oct 50; X Corps _Periodic Intelligence Report_ (_PIR_) 33.