[209] James T. Stewart, _Airpower, The Decisive Force in Korea_ (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1957) 13–15, 84–86; 1st MAW _HD_, May 51, Pts 4 and 5, Fifth Air Force Frag orders (hereafter listed as FAF FragOs), 20–31 May; 1st MAW _HD_ May 51, Pt 1, G-3 PORS for 20–31 May; _Ibid._, Pt 2, Staff Jrn G-3, 25 May, 26 May, 27 May, 31 May; EUSAK _Cmd Rept_, May 51, Sec II, Bk 4, Pts 5 and 6, Encls 20–31, PORs, sections entitled G-3 Air. Despite the “murky instrument weather” of 27 May the all-weather fighters of VMF(N)-513 reporting the killing of an estimated 425 CCF soldiers. Two F7F pilots killed or wounded some 200 Chinese Reds in the I Corps zone. On the following day the 1st MAW claimed a total of 454 KIA casualties inflicted on the enemy.[210] [210] _Ibid._, VMF(N)-513 HD, 27 May 51. Estimates of enemy dead by pilots are likely to be over-optimistic, but there can be no doubt that UN aircraft slaughtered the fleeing Communists in large numbers. Only poor flying weather saved the enemy from far worse casualties. So intent were the Chinese on escape that they violated their usual rule of making troop movements only by night. When the fog and mist cleared briefly, Marine pilots had glimpses of CCF units crowding the roads without any attempt at concealment. Napalm, bombs, and machine guns left heaps of dead and wounded as the survivors continued their flight, hoping for a return of fog and mist to protect them. _Initial Marine Objectives Secured_ As the Marine ground forces advanced, they found fewer and fewer Chinese Reds opposing them. The explanation was given by a prisoner from the 12th Division, V Corps, of the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA). His unit had the mission, he said, of relieving troops in the Yanggu-Inje area and conducting delaying actions. The purpose was to allow CCF units to escape a complete disaster and dig in farther north. The North Koreans, in short, were being sacrificed in rear guard delaying actions in order that the Chinese Reds might save their own skins. U.S. interrogators asked NKPA prisoners why they put up with such treatment. The answer was that they couldn’t help themselves. The Chinese had impressed them into service, armed them, and trained them after the NKPA collapse in the fall of 1950. They were under the thumb of political commissars holding life and death authority over them. Any NKPA soldier suspected of trying to shirk his duty or escape was certain to be shot like a dog. At least the man on the firing line had a chance to come out alive; the man who defied the system had none. This attitude accounts to a large extent for the many occasions when NKPA troops literally resisted to the last man in delaying actions. Marines in general, judging by their comments, considered the Chinese Red the better all-around soldier; but they credited the Korean Red with more tenacity on the defensive.