U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 4 (of 5): The East-Central FrontMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 4 (of 5): The East-Central Front
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
The Reds won the first of many such concessions with their refusal.
They insisted that the talks be held at Kaesong, and the UN Command let
them have it their way. The reason for the Communist decision was soon
made evident. Kaesong was in the path of the advancing Eighth Army,
which meant that an important road center would be immune from attack.
And though the ancient Korean town was originally in no man’s land, the
Communists soon managed to include it within their lines.
All delegates were requested to display white flags on their
vehicles for identification. Communist photographers were on hand
to snap countless pictures of UN delegates which convinced Asia’s
illiterate millions at a glance that the beaten United Nations had
sent representatives to plead for terms. If any doubt remained, other
photographs showed the unarmed UN delegates being herded about Kaesong
by scowling Communist guards with burp guns.
No detail of the stage setting was too trivial to be overlooked.
Oriental custom prescribes that at the peace table the victors face
south and the losers face north. Needless to add, the UN delegates
were seated at Kaesong with a view to enhancing Communist prestige.[245]
[245] Joy, _How Communists Negotiate_, 4–5.
Some of the propaganda schemes bordered on the ridiculous, “At the
first meeting of the delegates,” Admiral Joy related, “I seated myself
at the conference table and almost sank out of sight. The Communists
had provided a chair for me which was considerably shorter than a
standard chair. Across the table, the senior Communist delegate,
General Nam Il, protruded a good foot above my cagily diminished
stature. This had been accomplished by providing stumpy Nam Il with a
chair about four inches higher than usual. Chain-smoking Nam Il puffed
his cigarette in obvious satisfaction as he glowered down on me, an
obviously torpedoed admiral. This condition of affairs was promptly
rectified when I changed my foreshortened chair for a normal one, but
not before Communist photographers had exposed reels of film.”[246]
[246] _Ibid._
_Patrol Bases on_ BADGER _Line_
The war went on, of course, during the negotiations. But the tempo was
much reduced as the UN forces consolidated their gains, and the enemy
appeared to be breaking off contact at every opportunity. Generally
speaking, the Eighth Army had shifted from the offensive to the
defensive. In keeping with this trend, the 1st Marine Division occupied
the same positions for nearly three weeks after fighting its way to the
BROWN Line.
On 22 June all three infantry regiments were directed to establish
battalion-size patrol bases on the BADGER Line--1½ to 2½ miles forward
of their present positions. In the 1st Marines sector 3/7 was attached
to Colonel Brown and ordered to relieve 3/1 on the left flank of the
regiment. The purpose was to free 3/1 to move forward and establish a
patrol base on Hill 761, about 1,000 yards forward of the MLR.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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