While these arrangements were being carried out, General Almond called at the 1st Marines CP. He expressed surprise that the establishment of patrol bases was being contemplated by EUSAK when some of the front-line units were still in contact with the enemy.[247] [247] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jun 51, 55. Execution of these orders was accordingly suspended. The following day, however, Division again alerted the infantry regiments to be prepared to occupy patrol bases on order. This was by direction of Corps, which in turn had been directed by EUSAK. The Marine regimental and battalion commanders were not happy about this turn of affairs. The patrol base concept had been tried out early in May, during the lull between the enemy’s two offensives, and found wanting. In theory it was a good means of keeping contact with an enemy who had pulled back out of mortar and light artillery range. In practice the enemy had shown that he could bypass patrol bases at night for probing attacks on the MLR. The bases themselves ran the constant risk of being surrounded and overwhelmed. As a final objection, a regiment was often deprived of its reserve battalion, which was the logical choice for such duty. In compliance with orders, 3/1 moved out on 26 June and established a patrol base on Hill 761. This position received such a bombardment of large caliber mortar fire that Colonel Brown pulled the battalion back to the MLR the following day.[248] [248] CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 0815 27 Jun 51. General Thomas gave his opinion of the patrol base concept after his retirement when he summed it up as “an invitation to disaster.”[249] He could only carry out orders, however, when Corps directed early in July that a patrol base be established on Taeu-san. [249] Gen G. C. Thomas interv, 6 Feb 58. It is interesting to note that there was no mention of the patrol base concept in the then current _Field Service Regulations, Operations, FM 100-5_, published by the Department of the Army in August 1949. This 4,000-foot peak, located some 2 miles north of the MLR, afforded excellent observation eastward into the Punchbowl and westward into the So-chon River Valley. The enemy, of course, was aware of these advantages and had made Taeu-san a strongpoint of his MLR. This was clearly indicated by the stiff resistance encountered by KMC reconnaissance patrols.[250] [250] Unless otherwise specified, the remainder of this section is based on 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jul 51, 7–11; Col C. W. Harrison’s account, “KMC Attack on Taeu-san, 8-11 July 1951;” Col G. P. Groves, ltr of 9 Apr 58.