U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 4 (of 5): The East-Central FrontMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 4 (of 5): The East-Central Front
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
Nevertheless, Division G-3 was suddenly alerted on the morning of 7
July by the Marine Liaison Officer with X Corps to expect an order
directing the setting up of a patrol base on Taeu-san the following
day. The KMC Regiment, warned by telephone, had little time for
planning and organizing an attack. Since the KMCs could not be
relieved for responsibility for their sector, it was necessary to
form a composite battalion of the three companies that could most
conveniently be relieved. Unfortunately, they contained a large
proportion of recruits, and the battalion commander was a new arrival.
There were two avenues of approach. One was along an open, fairly
level, ridgeline that extended from the KMC positions. The other called
for a descent into the stream-bed generally paralleling the MLR and a
steep climb up a ridge leading directly north to Taeu-san.
Both routes of approach were used. One company advanced on the right
by way of the stream bed and two companies took to the ridgeline on
the left. The assault was to have been preceded by air strikes and an
artillery bombardment, but bad weather kept the aircraft grounded.
The attack jumped off at 1030 on 8 July. All three companies were
greeted by enemy mortar and machine gun fire that pinned down the
company on the right. The two companies on the left won a foothold on
Hill 1100, about a mile in front of Taeu-san. Here the advance ground
to a halt.
These KMCs dug in for the night and repulsed a series of
counterattacks. On the morning of the 9th the KMC regimental commander,
Colonel Kim Tai Shik, committed the entire 1st Battalion to the attack
on the right. It had no better success than the company of the day
before. Meanwhile, the two companies were driven off Hill 1100.
Colonel Gould P. Groves, senior liaison officer with the KMCs,
recommended that the remnants of the two companies be withdrawn. The
1st Battalion had managed to capture Hill 1001, but it was plain that
the KMC regiment could not come close to Taeu-san. On 12 July the 1st
Marine Division informed X Corps that the position held by the KMCs
just forward of Hill 1001 fulfilled the requirements of an advance
patrol base. As far as the Marines were concerned, the sad affair was
permitted to rest there.
As evidence of the valiant effort made by the KMCs, they suffered 222
casualties. A sequel to this story was written late in July after the
2d infantry Division relieved the Marines. X Corps again ordered the
capture of Taeu-san as a patrol base, and it required the commitment of
the major part of the division to accomplish the task.[251]
[251] X Corps _Cmd Rpt_, Jul 51, 13; 2dInfDiv _HD_, Jul 51,
13–19.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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