The enemy immediately took possession of evacuated ground which enabled him to fire into the front lines of Easy Company. At 0500 another Marine counterattack began, with Easy Company making a frontal assault and the 2d Platoon of Fox Company striking the enemy flank. It was the same platoon that had delivered the flank attack resulting in the capture of Hill 812. Again 2/Fox struck the decisive blow with grenades and automatic weapons. The surprise was too much for enemy troops who hastened back to their own side of the Rock, leaving 60 counted dead behind.[293] [293] 1st Marine Division losses of 33 killed and 235 wounded during the three-day attack were incurred for the must part by the 5th Marines in general and 2/5 in particular. Enemy casualties of this period were reported as 972 KIA (265 counted) and 113 prisoners. This was the last action of a battle that had occupied all three Marine regiments from 11 to 20 September inclusive while the KMC Regiment patrolled aggressively on the Division left flank. Three of the four Division objectives had been secured after savage fights, but Objective CHARLIE (the ridgeline northwest of Hill 1052 in the KMC zone) had yet to be attacked when Division OpnO 26-51 put an abrupt stop to offensive movement. Not only was the fight west of Hill 812 the last action of the 1st Marine Division’s nine-day battle; it was the last action of mobility for Marines in Korea. As time went on, it would become more and more apparent that 20 September 1951 dated a turning point in the Korean conflict. On that day the warfare of movement came to an end, and the warfare of position began. CHAPTER X The New Warfare of Position _Sectors of Major_ EUSAK _Units--Statement by General Van Fleet--Hill 854 Secured by 3/1--Helicopter Troop Lift to Hill 884--Helicopter Operation_ BLACKBIRD--_“To Organize, Construct, and Defend”--Marine Operations of November 1951--The Second Marine Christmas in Korea_ Two and a half weeks of hard fighting had taken place along the X Corps front when General James A. Van Fleet paid a visit on 16 September 1951. The commanding general of EUSAK wished to inspect the operations and determine the morale of the 1st Marine Division and 2d Infantry Division, both of which had suffered heavy casualties. He found the morale of these X Corps units good and had no adverse criticisms of their operations. While on this tour of inspection, however, he issued the following three directives to X Corps: (1) That replacements would be integrated into units only when the battalion or larger-sized unit to which they were assigned was in reserve; (2) that certain ‘choke points’ [General Van Fleet pointed out the locations on the map] be interdicted to prevent enemy reinforcements or withdrawals through these points;