U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 4 (of 5): The East-Central FrontMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 4 (of 5): The East-Central Front
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
Tactical units not organic to the 1st Marine Division but attached at
this time were, in addition to the 1st KMC Regiment, the 1st Korean
Artillery Battalion, the 1st Platoon, 92d U.S. Army Searchlight
Company, and Battery C, 1st 4.5″ Rocket Battalion.
The new Korean artillery battalion consisted of two medium (155mm) and
two light (105mm) howitzer batteries. Major General Gerald C. Thomas,
commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, approved a plan for
placing this unit in the Punchbowl on 9 January to reinforce Lieutenant
Colonel Sherman W. Parry’s 1st Battalion, 11th Marines.
Enemy units opposing the 1st Marine Division up to 23 January 1952
were the 1st, 15th, and 47th NKPA Divisions with an estimated combined
strength of 25,750 men. On the 23d the 15th Division was relieved by
the 45th.
The enemy, according to the Division report, showed “greater caution
than he had in previous months, and friendly outposts and ambuscades
noted fewer contacts. His harassing mortar and artillery fires
increased in volume through the month. Meanwhile, extensive efforts to
improve his defenses continued with particular attention being given to
reverse slope installations.”[339]
[339] _Ibid._, 1, 6, 7.
_Ambush Patrol on New Year’s Eve_
The new year was but a few minutes old when the first Marine action
took place. Captain Charles W. McDonald’s Baker Company had been
directed by Lieutenant Colonel Kirt W. Norton, commanding the 1st
Battalion, 5th Marines, to send out an ambush patrol on New Year’s Eve.
A rifle squad, a light machine gun squad, an interpreter, and a
corpsman composed the little column wearing white camouflage clothing
which made the men all but invisible against a background of snow.
After getting into position, the patrol settled down for the usual
long wait. Darkness was the enemy’s element, and Marine ambushers ran
the risk of being ambushed themselves. This time, however, a six-man
North Korean patrol came within five yards before the Marines let the
enemy have it with machine gun and rifle fire which inflicted one KIA
and four estimated WIA casualties. Efforts to take a prisoner were
frustrated as the NKPA survivors melted away into the darkness. The
Baker Company patrol returned without casualties at 0400.[340]
[340] 1/5 _HD_, Dec 51, 31; 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jan 52, 3.
Marine operations were still limited by the EUSAK “cease fire”
directive which went into effect for a month on 27 November 1951 in
accordance with a decision reached during the armistice negotiations
at Panmunjom. UN and Communist delegates agreed on a line of
demarcation, known to the Eighth Army as Line DUCK. It linked up points
of repeated EUSAK patrol contacts, not to exceed 2,000 yards beyond
the MLR. Operations past this line, running generally parallel with
Line MINNESOTA, could not be launched without permission from corps
commanders.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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