Operations of the first few days demonstrated to 1st Marine Division ground forces that locating the enemy was more of a problem than defeating him. Obviously, the NKPA 10th Division had few if any of the advantages which make for effective guerrilla warfare. Far from receiving any voluntary support from the inhabitants, the Korean Reds had their own movements promptly reported to the Marines. Retaliations on civilians, such as burning mountain villages, were not calculated to improve relations. Nor did the enemy possess any of the other requisites for successful operations in an opponent’s rear--a base, a source of supply, good communications, and a reliable intelligence system. If it came to a fight, there could be little doubt about the outcome. But Marine staff officers must have been reminded of the old recipe for rabbit pie which begins, “First, catch your rabbit.” Such a situation called for systematic patrolling in all Marine zones of action. Secondary roads and mountain trails were covered by “rice paddy patrols.” Numbering from four men to a squad, these groups ranged far and wide on foot in an area that was more often vertical than horizontal. On a single day the 5th Marines alone had 29 of these rice paddy patrols in action.[56] No better training for replacements could have been devised. Sometimes the men were on their own for several days, depending for supplies on helicopter drops. And while casualties were light, there was just enough danger from sniping and potential ambushes to keep the replacements on the alert. [56] 5thMar _WD_, Jan-Feb 51. Roads fit for vehicles--especially the 75-mile stretch of MSR from Pohang to Andong--were under the constant surveillance of motorized patrols, each supported by at least one tank or 105mm howitzer. The farthest distance was 15 miles between the main Marine strong points at Pohang, Yongchon, Uisong, and Andong.[57] [57] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jan 51. Close air support was seldom needed against such an elusive enemy as the Marines faced. General Craig put in a request, however, for an air squadron to be based at Pohang or Pusan (Map 2). The two Marine all-weather squadrons, VMF(N)-513 and VMF(N)-542, were General Harris’ first and second choices. They had been flying under Air Force (314th Air Division) control in the defense of Japan, a mission of dull routine and waiting for something to break the monotony of patrolling. The twin-engined F7F-3N Tigercats of VMF(N)-542 were well equipped with electronics equipment for night interceptor work. VMF(N)-513 flew F4U-5Ns, the night-fighter modification of the latest Corsair.[58] [58] The remainder of this section, except when otherwise noted, is based on 1stMAW _HD_, Jan 51 and VMF(N)-513 _HD_, Jan 51. See Glossary in Appendix A for explanations of aircraft designations.