U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 4 (of 5): The East-Central FrontMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 4 (of 5): The East-Central Front
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
General Harris’ plan for VMF(N)-542 to take over the duties of
VMF(N)-513 at Itazuke had the approval of General Partridge. This made
it possible to send the latter squadron to K-9 at Pusan to replace the
VMF-311 jets, which in turn left for Itami to await corrections of
engineering defects.
VMF(N)-513 flew its first combat missions from K-9 on 22 January. These
consisted of routine armed reconnaissance flights and an occasional
deep support mission for the Eighth Army. Not until the 25th did the
squadron respond to a request from Marine ground forces. And out of 49
combat missions (110 sorties) during the remaining 6 days of the month,
only three (10 sorties) were in support of the 1st Marine Division.
For routine operations the Marine ground forces found the support
of VMO-6 sufficient. The nimble little OY observation planes were
ideal for seeking out an enemy who had to be caught before he could
be fought. And the helicopters did their part by dropping supplies,
evacuating casualties, and laying wire.
Meanwhile, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing strengthened its administrative
ties with the 1st Marine Division. Although the two organizations had
no common operational commander other than General MacArthur, they
maintained a close liaison. Harris attached two TBM Avengers to VMO-6
for use as radio relays when ground-to-ground communications failed
in the mountainous Pohang-Andong area. He also set up daily courier
flights, at General Smith’s request, to provide fast administrative
liaison between widely dispersed Marine air and ground units in Korea
and Japan.
_Operations_ THUNDERBOLT _and_ ROUNDUP
On 25 January two corps of the Eighth Army jumped off in Operation
THUNDERBOLT. Advancing side by side, I Corps and IX Corps had orders
to launch limited objective attacks and regain solid contact with the
enemy, who was obviously preparing for a new offensive.
The EUSAK commander moved his CP from Taegu to Chonan (Map 1), the
I Corps headquarters, in order to maintain personal control of the
operation. He requested the Navy to step up offshore patrolling on the
west coast as left-flank protection. Emphasis was also placed on aerial
reconnaissance, both visual and photographic, as well as deep support
directed by the Mosquitoes.
Even VMF(N)-542 at Itazuke had orders to conduct long flights to Seoul
and maintain continuous patrols to report any attempt of the enemy to
retire across the frozen Han River. The F7F-3N pilots shot up camp
areas, convoys, and other lucrative targets but found no indications
of large-scale crossings over the ice.[59] So varied were the missions
of the squadron that it came as no surprise to be assigned to naval
gunfire spotting for the USS _St. Paul_ and the other British and
American cruisers shelling Inchon.
[59] VMF(N)-542 _HD_, Jan 51.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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