As soon as the OP INTENT (Operations Intentions Report) was on its way to General Barcus for approval, the 1st MAW intelligence section began to prepare the target dossiers (including photographs, flak analysis, and related identification information) on each of the approved targets. The compiled dossiers were then sent to the appropriate tactical squadron. At this point, still perhaps a half-day before issuance of the FAF orders, the squadrons received two major advantages over the previous system: (1) Adequate photo intelligence employed for the first time since FAF had assumed operational control of 1st MAW; and (2) A substantial lead time advantage for proper briefing of pilots and arming of aircraft. After the strike, and usually within an hour, Marine planes photographed the targets for damage assessment. These photos were annotated and an assessment report prepared. This information was then presented by the G-2 and G-3 to the wing commander. Immediately thereafter, prints of the photographs were distributed to the appropriate tactical units, thus making post-strike photography more freely available on a regular basis to the participating tactical units. In a letter dated 18 February, General Barcus approved most of the 1st MAW commander’s specific requests, but retained full control over General Megee’s squadrons used in close air support. This was due to the fact that EUSAK-FAF joint policy required CAS mission requests to be approved by JOC, in accordance with daily Eighth Army priorities, which allocated the aircraft for each request. Returned to operational control of the Marine wing were planes used on interdiction, armed reconnaissance and general support activities--the planes on strikes beyond the bombline, the photo, and all-weather (night) squadrons. FAF also retained control over assignment of missions to VMC-1, the electronics unit. Although some of the Marine wing tactical squadrons thus newly enjoyed the advantages of flying under their own commander’s wings, 1st MAW headquarters staff members had to pay for these benefits. An increased work load swamped the G-2 section, where 7 photo interpreters were kept busy 16 hours a day, 7 days a week. Marine personnel processed and reviewed an average of 100,000 prints per month and these were “only those from that portion of the VMJ-1 effort devoted to 1st MAW operations.”[323] Expansion of 1st MAW headquarters to set up a tactical planning capability pointed to a deficiency in the wing organization T/O, a weakness that existed during the rest of the war. [323] _Ibid._, p. 10-80.