While General Barcus earlier had General Megee’s recommendations under study, a radio news broadcast back in the States momentarily resulted in poor publicity for the Marine Corps. On 1 February a nationally syndicated columnist reported instances in which friendly troops had been bombed and strafed by U.S. aircraft. Marine Corps planes were the most careless, the broadcaster alleged, basing his statement on incomplete information. The news story had developed from an unfortunate publicity release issued by FEAF dealing with a MAG-33 incident. The phrasing implied that Marine aviators were “guilty of gross carelessness resulting in casualties among their own ground troops.”[324] [324] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 9-81. Actually, of the 63 incidents in which friendly casualties had resulted from aircraft flown by FAF units between January and October 1952, 1st MAW pilots were responsible for 18, or 28.5 percent of the total number of incidents and majority of casualties. What was left unsaid, however, in the unfavorable publicity was that with approximately 14.5 percent of the aircraft represented in FEAF, Marine fliers had been accomplishing monthly totals of between 30 to 40 percent of all Eighth Army CAS missions. They also performed virtually all of the very close air support jobs (50 to 100 yards out from the MLR) which further reduced the comparative percentage of Marine “carelessness.” It was true, of course, that on rare occasions freak accidents did kill and injure UN troops, despite the continual training of pilots and controllers in strike procedures and target identification. The position taken by the two senior Marine commanders in Korea was that although any CAS incident involving friendly troops was highly regrettable, it was in the same category as “short” mortar and artillery rounds and just as unavoidable. Target identification, low visibility flying conditions, and ballistic computations made the task of precision close air support an enormous one. If anything, it was almost a wonder that more accidents did not happen. Despite the similarity of Korean geography, an unending panorama of almost identical hilltops, ridges, and streams, the pilot had to release ordnance at the proper altitude and speed, and in a balanced (trim) flight. While conducting his dive the pilot’s view could be blocked by cloud formations and his attention distracted by antiaircraft fire which required evasive action. Even when the ordnance had been properly released, prevailing wind conditions could affect the flight path of the bombs. This, in addition to human error and mechanical factors, such as the occasional malfunctioning of parts, also affected the accuracy of bombing.