Throughout the November 1952-March 1953 period, 1st MAW squadrons continued to provide the bulk of close air sorties to the 1st Marine Division, in keeping with General Barcus’ policy stated earlier in 1952. Between November and January there had been a lull in the heavy ground fighting that had prevailed in October and little need to request air strikes. When enemy forces opposing the division began to grow more active in February, however, the requirement for air support to 1st MarDiv greatly increased. During this month 1st MAW aviators reached an all-time high in the percentage of their total CAS sorties devoted to the division--two of every three wing close support sorties went to General Pollock’s infantry regiments. On the critical issue of close air support, the Marine division had become better satisfied by the end of 1952 with the quantity of air support received from FAF. A continuing difficulty, however, was the delayed response to requests for immediate CAS. For the wing, several other conditions existed which bothered General Megee. One was that the VMA-312 carrier-based squadron was not utilized to any great extent in execution of CAS missions. This detrimental condition saddled the wing commander with an “unqualified” squadron. It also prevented pilots from practicing a highly developed skill they were responsible for maintaining, although later in the war this condition was gradually alleviated. Two other difficulties--centralized control of CAS mission assignments by JOC and the prevailing differences between the Marine and Air Force/Army CAS communications systems and request procedures--were never rectified.[325] [325] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p. 10-80. One long-standing difficulty, though not a CAS matter, had been solved early in the winter. Following a series of mechanical troubles with the F3D-2 aircraft in VMF(N)-513 and prolonged delay in receipt of blast tube extensions for its 20mm guns, the squadron finally became fully operational on 1 November with its complement of 12 of the new jet Skyknight aircraft. Almost as soon as the F3D-2s were ready for night work, FEAF had put them to escorting B-29s on bombing runs over North Korea. With the F3D escort and changes in B-29 tactics, bomber losses, which had been severe, decreased sharply. Enemy attackers became fewer and fewer so that by February, air-to-air opposition was encountered only infrequently. Instead of sending up groups of night fighters at the escorted B-29s, the enemy would fly a single jet across the bomber formation. If a Skyknight followed, one or two MIG-15s, well to the rear and higher than the decoy, would attempt to gun down the Skyknight in its pursuit. But because of the F3D tail warning radar, the Marine radar operator could detect the enemy plane in its approach for the kill before it got within effective firing range.