U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West KoreaUnited States. Marine Corps
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West Korea
United States. Marine Corps
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
[464] Presentation of this second Korean PUC to the 1st MAW
was made by South Korean President Rhee in impressive
ceremonies 12 June at MAG-33 headquarters, K-3. Among
the many ranking military officials attending the
ceremony was Admiral Radford, former CinCPacFlt, and
newly-appointed Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The fighter-bombers of MAG-33 and the MAG-12 attack planes saw heavy
action during 24–30 June when the Chinese again concentrated their
attention on ROK divisions in the UNC line. Peak operational day was 30
June. Marine squadrons alone executed 301 sorties, including 28 percent
of the CAS and 24 percent of total FAF interdiction missions. It was
also an outstanding day for MAG-12 which “outdid itself by flying 217
combat sorties against enemy forces. The 30th of this month saw MAG-12
establish a new ordnance record when an all-time high of 340 tons of
bombs and napalm were dropped on North Korea.”[465] Contributing
heavily to this accomplishment was Marine Attack Squadron 121. It
unleashed 156 tons of ordnance, a squadron record. It was believed this
also established an all-time record for tonnage expended on the enemy
by a Marine single-engine propeller squadron.
[465] MAG-12 ComdD, Jun 53, p. C-1.
_Other Marine Defense Activities_[466]
[466] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 5, Chaps. 2, 8, No.
6, Chaps. 2, 9; WCIDE(U) ComdDs, Oct 52-Jun 53; ECIDE(U)
ComdDs, Oct 52-Jun 53; Cagle and Manson, _Sea War,
Korea_; Field, _NavOps, Korea_.
Like their counterparts on the Korean mainland, the Marines, naval
gunfire teams, and ROK security troops comprising the West Coast and
East Coast Island Defense Commands felt the alternating pressure
build-up and slow-down that typified the closing months of the war.
At both installations the defense had been recently strengthened,
more or less by way of response to a CINCPacFleet intelligence
evaluation in December 1952. This alerted the isolated island forces
to the possibility of a renewed Communist attempt to recapture their
positions. The Allied east coast defense structure at Wonsan, right at
the enemy’s own front door just above the 39th Parallel, was considered
particularly vulnerable.
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