U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West KoreaUnited States. Marine Corps
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West Korea
United States. Marine Corps
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
As in the preceding months, the mission of the west coast island group
remained unchanged--namely, the occupation, defense, and control of
its six island components. These, it will be remembered, were: Sok-to,
Cho-do, Paengyong-do (command headquarters), Yongpyong-do, and the two
lesser islands at Taechong-do and Tokchok-to.[467] Formal designation
of the island commands was modified on 1 January 1953. At this time
the West Coast and East Coast Island Defense Elements (TE 95.15 and
TE 95.23) were redesignated as Task Units (TU 95.1.3 and TU 95.2.3)
respectively. Korean Marines, who represented the bulk of these task
units, were provided from the 2d KMC Regiment, the island security
force. This unit constituted the main defense for the important U.S.
Marine-controlled islands off the Korean west and east coasts.
[467] Locations given on WCIDE map, Chapter II.
Approximately 17 Marine officers and 100 enlisted men were assigned
to the western coastal complex, with two battalions of Korean Marines
fleshing out the garrison defense. The primary mission of this
island group was to serve as offshore bases for UNC intelligence
activities, including encouragement of friendly guerrilla operations
conducted by anti-Communist North Korean personnel. Artillery based
on the Marine-controlled islands provided both defensive fires and
counterbattery missions against enemy guns sited on the nearby mainland.
The secondary mission of WCIDU, that of training Korean troops in
infantry and weapons firing exercises, continued to be hampered
somewhat by faulty communication. As one officer observed, the training
program to qualify selected KMCs for naval gunfire duties “met with
only modest success, due primarily to the language barrier and lack
of communications equipment in the Korean Marine Corps. Personnel
who had received this training did prove to be extremely helpful in
accompanying raiding parties on the mainland in that they were able to
call for and adjust fires.”[468]
[468] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9, p. 9-128. See also
Chapter II.
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