Enemy pressure against the West Coast Islands, both from Communist shore guns and bombing, had increased during the fall and winter of 1952. Cho-do, shaped roughly like a giant downward-plunging fish, as previously noted had been bombed in October for the first time in the history of the command. This new trend was repeated for the next two months. By way of response, two 90mm guns were transferred to Cho-do from Kanghwa-do (a more peaceful guerrilla-controlled island northwest of Inchon) for use there as counterbattery fire against aggressive mainland batteries. The islands of Sok-to and Paengyong-do had likewise been bombed during this period, although no damage or serious casualties resulted. In December, enemy shore guns fired 752 rounds against Task Force 95 (United Nations Blockading and Escort Force) ships charged with responsibility for the island defense, in contrast to the 156 rounds of the preceding month. Intelligence in December from “Leopard,” the friendly Korean guerrilla unit at Paengyong-do, also reported the presence of junks, rubber boats, and a nearby enemy artillery battalion off Chinnampo, believed to be in readiness to attack the island. A captured POW, moreover, on 22 December reported that elements of the 23d NKPA Brigade located on the mainland across from Sok-to would attempt to seize the island group before the end of the year. The next day, shortly after dusk, when a concentration of 200 rounds[469] of 76mm suddenly fell on Sok-to, and another 125 rounds struck neighboring Cho-do, it looked as if it might be the beginning of trouble. Naval gunfire (NGF) spotters on the islands directed the fire from UNC patrol boats cruising the Yellow Sea. This counterbattery fire quickly silenced the enemy guns. Again, at the end of the month, West Coast islands were alerted for an invasion, but it never materialized. [469] An average day’s enemy harassment consisted of 4, 7, 10, or at the most approximately 28 rounds of fire. WCIDE ComdDs, _passim_. A matter of continuing concern to the command during the fall and winter months was the North Korean refugee problem. So serious was the situation, in fact, that it had warranted a directive from the TF 95 commander (Rear Admiral John E. Gingrich). In the early fall, a large number of refugees had filtered into the West Coast Islands, raising serious doubts as to their feeding and ultimate survival during the Korean winter. Through the United Nations Civil Assistance Command, a tentative date of September had been set for evacuating these North Korean refugees to South Korea. By November the question of their relocation was still not settled, although the feeding problem had been eased somewhat by two LST-resupply loads of emergency rations and grain by CTF 90.