U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West KoreaUnited States. Marine Corps
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 5 (of 5): Operations in West Korea
United States. Marine Corps
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
The fighting continued until 0315, reaching a hand-to-hand clash at one
stage. In addition to mortar and artillery fire, the enemy employed
small arms, automatic weapons, hand and stick-type grenades, bangalore
torpedoes, and 57mm recoilless rifles. During the attack, patrols were
sent out from the MLR and OP 2, to the west, to reestablish contact and
help with casualty evacuation.
Well to the rear of the outpost and unknown to its occupants,
intelligence personnel intercepted a Chinese message ordering the
Communists to withdraw. Immediately, friendly artillery fired on
all known escape routes available to the attackers. Despite this
interdicting fire, the enemy soldiers managed to withdraw without
further loss. Their unsuccessful thrust against the 2/5 OPLR cost the
Chinese 25 known killed, 25 estimated killed, 45 known wounded, and 3
prisoners. Marine casualties were 6 killed, 5 missing, and 25 wounded
and evacuated.[46]
[46] One of those wounded was Corporal Duane E. Dewey, a
machine gunner. He was wounded twice, in fact, the
second time from an exploding enemy grenade which he had
rolled upon to shield two nearby comrades. Dewey somehow
survived, and the following March, after release from
the Marine Corps, he went to the White House where he
received the Medal of Honor, the first to be presented by
the new President, Dwight D. Eisenhower. (Duane E. Dewey
Biog. File)
Why the Chinese had selected OP 3 for their mid-April attack is not
known. Several theories, however, have been advanced by those involved
in the action. Colonel Culhane, the regimental commander, believed that
the enemy incursion “was the direct result of the aggressive patrols
that frequently used the outpost as a point of departure....”[47]
Brigadier General Merrill B. Twining, the assistant division commander
since 22 March, declared that the position was too large for a
reinforced platoon to hold.[48] Perhaps the Chinese had harbored the
same thoughts before the night of 15–16 April.
[47] _Culhane ltr._
[48] LtGen Merrill B. Twining ltr to Deputy Asst CofS, G-3,
HQMC, dtd 19 Aug 54.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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